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The U.S. has reached a crossroads with its policy regarding assassination.  
Executive Order 12333, which explicitly and absolutely prohibits assassination, is still in 
effect.  The ban, however, has been diluted and circumvented since its inception.   Past 
administrations have targeted enemy leaders with “indirect” strikes such as the 1986 
attacks against Libya and the 1998 missile strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan.  Currently, 
the U.S. deliberately targets individual enemies, whether in the context of an armed 
conflict, such as Afghanistan or Iraq, or in the war on terror, such as the November 2002 
Predator Hellfire missile strike in Yemen.  This ostensibly duplicitous policy has caused 
controversy for the U.S., both internally among policy makers, military leaders, 
operatives, and the American public, and externally with the international community.   
This thesis examines the evolution of U.S. assassination policy, and proposes 
recommendations for modernizing the Executive Order.  The intent is to provide decision 
makers with a clear point of reference, and a framework for determining when 
assassination is the best—or at a very minimum, the “least bad”—possible option for 
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A. RECENT ASSASSINATION EPISODES   
On the morning of July 23, 2003, Special Operations Forces from Task Force 20 
rang the bell on the gate of a mansion in Mosul, Northern Iraq.  The owner of the 
residence answered and was quickly hustled away by U.S. forces.  After calling with a 
bullhorn for the remaining occupants to surrender, commandos entered the residence, 
only to be met with a fusillade of gunfire.  The assault team retreated and turned the 
operation over to forces from the 101st Airborne, who had cordoned off the area and 
surrounded the target building.  In the ensuing attempt to dislodge the building’s 
occupants, U.S. forces engaged their foes with heavy weapons, grenades, helicopter-fired 
missile and small arms fire in a four-hour engagement (Nordland & Thomas, 2003).  The 
U.S. forces were targeting the number two and three most wanted High Value Targets 
(HVTs) in Iraq, Saddam Hussein’s sons Uday and Qusay.  In the end, Uday and Qusay 
Hussein (along with a bodyguard and Qusay’s teenage son) were dead, riddled with 
bullets.  U.S. forces put their corpses on display to leave no doubt to the Iraqi people and 
the world that the Hussein regime’s reign of terror was over. 
The first salvos of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), the U.S.-led invasion of 
Iraq, were Defense Department-coined “Decapitation Operations;” precision-guided 
munitions strikes based on actionable intelligence and aimed specifically at Saddam 
Hussein and his regime’s leaders.  On April 8, 2003, an Air Force B-1 bomber dropped 
four 900 kg bunker-penetrating Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs), leaving an eight-
by-fifteen meter crater where Saddam Hussein and his sons had allegedly gathered 
minutes prior to the strike (Nakhoul, 2003).  The U.S. made it unwaveringly clear that 
Saddam Hussein and his cronies were legitimate targets of lethal force throughout the 
campaign.   
On November 3, 2002, a CIA-operated Predator UAV fired a Hellfire missile into 
a vehicle in Yemen, vaporizing the car and its occupants, including a known terrorist and 
his associates.  This action took place far from what is generally considered the front 
lines of the war on terror; the killings, apparently also sanctioned by Yemen’s 
1 
government, were the first publicized U.S. eliminations of terrorists outside of 
Afghanistan.  
What is the significance of these high-profile operations?  If we compare them to 
operations prior to the September 11, 2001 (I will use “9/11” to reference this date) 
terrorist attacks, it is clear they demonstrate a definitive departure from standard U.S. 
assassination policy of the last three decades. 
B. DILUTING THE ABSOLUTE 
In 1975, the Church Congressional Committee revelations alleging CIA “Rogue 
Elephant” behavior in plotting to assassinate various foreign leaders led President Ford to 
issue an Executive Order banning political assassinations.  This policy was further 
clarified by President Reagan in his 1981 Executive Order 12333 which explicitly stated, 
“No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall 
engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination” (Addicott, 2002).  Assassination is 
considered a murderous and treacherous act under international law statutes.  Over the 
last two decades, however, the U.S. has found ways to avoid explicit violation of the ban 
while still targeting enemies for elimination.   By focusing attacks on situational targets 
(training camps, government compounds) rather than specific individuals, military action 
has circumvented strict legal interpretation of the Executive Order and international law.  
Two high-profile cases in point are the bombing of Mu’ammar Gadhafi's living quarters 
in 1986 and the attempt to kill Osama bin Laden with cruise missiles in 1998.  During 
Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, U.S. military and political leaders were quick to 
dubiously assert that U.S. forces were not directly targeting Saddam Hussein for 
assassination, despite very precise bombing of his last-known locations.  
The apparent duplicity and confusion in U.S. assassination policy caused 
inordinate hand wringing and frustration at the operational and tactical level for military 
leaders and intelligence operatives throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s.  During the 1990’s, 
the U.S. encouraged internal rebellion in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.  Yet in 1995, CIA agent 
Robert Baer was subjected to a humiliating and ultimately career-ending FBI 
investigation for supposedly violating Executive Order 12333 in a conspiracy to murder 
Saddam Hussein (Baer, 2002, p. 5).  During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 
1980’s, the U.S. provided enormous covert support to the mujahideen fighters.  However, 
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the CIA went through extreme operational and tactical contortions to avoid even the most 
remote connection with perceived targeted killing of Russian officers.  In fact, due to fear 
of Congressional accusations of assassination efforts, the CIA refused to provide long-
range sights for sniper rifles despite massive weapons and ammunition support (Crile, 
2003, p. 361). 
Today, there appears to be no such fear or hesitation in the targeted killing of 
individuals.  The 9/11 terrorist attacks on U.S. soil produced a profound and, perhaps, 
necessary change to the U.S.’s counter-terrorism policies.  On September 14, 2001, the 
U.S. Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing the use of armed force against 
nations, organizations, or persons that the President determined had planned, authorized, 
committed or aided the terrorist acts of 9/11.  Additionally, according to press reports, 
President Bush ordered the CIA “to undertake its most sweeping and lethal covert action 
since the founding of the agency in 1947” (Carroll, 2001); this directive allowed the CIA 
to conduct a “targeted killing campaign” against Osama bin Laden and selected members 
of his Al Qaeda network.  President Bush provided written legal authority (without 
requiring further authorization) for the CIA to eliminate terrorists from an approved list if 
“capture is impractical and civilian casualties can be minimized” (Risen & Johnston, 
2002).   The Bush administration has legitimized lethal force by classifying al Qaeda as 
enemy combatants in a terrorist war against the U.S.   At least one of the terrorists killed 
in the Yemen operation was allegedly on this Presidential “hit-list.” 
Despite this legitimization of targeted force against individuals, however, there 
has been no overt or stated change to Executive Order 12333.  Each new president is 
required to sign pre-existing executive orders if the order is to continue as administration 
policy.   Executive Order 12333 remains in effect, standing in the face of what appears to 
be a liberalized assassination policy.   Many argued that the CIA action in Yemen was an 
assassination or, by Amnesty International’s definition, an “extra-judicial execution;” and 
was a violation of the standing Executive Order.  Similarly, following the killing of Uday 
and Qusay Hussein, Congressman Charlie Rangel argued publicly on the Fox News 
program Hannity and Colmes, that U.S. forces had acted illegally and clearly violated the 
assassination ban.    
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Valid or not, these arguments raise questions about the relevance and 
appropriateness of Executive Order 12333.   In 1992, Roger Herbert explored the subject 
of U.S. assassination policy in his thesis entitled, Bullets with Names: The Deadly 
Dilemma.   Herbert’s thesis is a useful point of departure from which to launch my own 
exploration of U.S. assassination policy, especially in light of recent and current events.    
I will use Herbert’s thesis as a baseline and springboard for a policy analysis in modern 
context.   
U.S. assassination policy deserves review.  Since Herbert’s thesis eleven years 
ago, the U.S. has indeed “turned the corner” on its assassination policy, though not in 
readily apparent ways.   President Bush has not rescinded the Executive Order banning 
assassination; it still stands, as ambiguous as ever, with no additional definitional or 
implicative clarification, no modification, and no additional legislation.  However, the 
Bush administration has further diluted the ban through the reported covert “intelligence 
finding” which authorized the assassination campaign against Al Qaeda following the 
9/11 attacks.    
C. THESIS ROADMAP 
Given the post 9/11 authorizations of President Bush, the question is no longer 
“if” in terms of the U.S. engaging in assassination, but rather “how” the U.S. should 
continue its current policy of allowing targeted killing/assassination.  Should 12333 be 
ignored, abandoned, or reinterpreted?  When is assassination legitimate, or illegitimate?  
When is it practical, or impractical?  This thesis will address these topics in detail.  First, 
I will review and summarize Roger Herbert’s arguments, establishing the relevance and 
context in relation to current events.  I will define assassination, distinguishing the 
differences among what is commonly understood as assassination, what assassination 
really is, and what the emerging policy of targeted killing of enemy combatants permits 
as an essential facet of the “war on terror” since 9/11.  Through detailed case analysis, in 
particular the Yemen assassination, I will thoroughly examine the moral, ethical, 
political, legal, and practical tensions surrounding such a policy.  Additionally, I will 
attempt to establish a framework for determining the criteria in employing assassination 
as a practical, useful, and legal/ethical instrument of foreign policy, and determine who is 
best suited to execute this policy.  I will examine the Israeli example and its relevance to 
4 
U.S. assassination policy.  Finally, I will offer prescriptions and recommendations for 
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II. PAST ANALYSIS: DEFINING THE UNDEFINABLE 
A. BULLETS WITH NAMES 
In 1992, LT Roger Herbert explored the subject of U.S. assassination policy in his 
Naval Postgraduate School thesis entitled, Bullets with Names: The Deadly Dilemma.  
Herbert’s work is a useful point of departure from which to conduct examination of U.S. 
assassination policy, especially in light of recent and current events.  In my thesis, I will 
not attempt to re-review the history behind and evolution of the ban; Herbert’s work 
provides a detailed, thorough examination of assassination history and the controversies 
surrounding U.S. assassination policy.  I will, however, summarize his findings, and 
throughout my thesis will refer back to his analysis as a comparative device in my own 
examination of the topic.   
In Bullets with Names, Herbert covers the origins of assassination as a political 
instrument and discusses the use of assassination in American foreign policy.  He 
includes as case studies the famous Yamamoto assassination in World War II and the 
Phoenix Program’s assassinations throughout the conflict in Vietnam.  Herbert details the 
mid 1970s Congressional Committee inquiries, including Nedzi, Pike and Church, which 
reviewed alleged misdeeds and developed the basis for the Executive Order banning 
assassination.  He discusses the frictions associated with this absolute policy, including 
the difficulties that arise from excluding assassination from warfighting at both the 
national and sub-national level, especially in counterinsurgency operations.  Herbert 
covers assassination and deterrence, and details the challenges and costs associated with a 
democracy practicing assassination in view of realpolitik.  
Herbert argues that utilitarian considerations would view assassination as the most 
moral and precise application of deadly force.  However, the “draconian” practice of 
assassination as an instrument of foreign policy would contradict the U.S.’s democratic 
ideals.   Herbert maintains that although assassination may appear useful in the short 
term, assassination “cannot support long-term U.S. policy goals or warfighting efforts.  
Ultimately, such methods could weaken America’s global position” (Herbert, 1992, p. 
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viii).  Therefore, in Herbert’s view assassination has no place in America’s warfighting 
arsenal. 
Herbert does argue that Executive Order 12333’s ban on assassination is flawed, 
dysfunctional, and requires re-evaluation.  The mid 1970s Congressional Committee 
findings “shaped the American perception of political assassination as conspiratorial 
murder- repugnant, lurid and laughingly ineffective” (Herbert, 1992, p. 15).  Actions that 
caused this perception were the types the ban justifiably sought to outlaw, but the very 
lack of definition within the text of the executive order leaves plenty of room for 
‘assassination’ to include actions that differ in kind and degree from classic scenarios 
(Herbert, 1992, p. 15).  The order treats assassination as an absolute, but the issue of 
assassination in American foreign policy is a dilemma, not an absolute.   If the U.S. is to 
survive the changing patterns of the global environment, U.S. leaders should have a 
framework for decision making with regards to assassination that is just as capable of 
change and adaptation to new threats and situations.   Herbert states, “The best 
prescription for preserving a necessary degree of ambiguity while protecting American 
credibility abroad, is to rescind the assassination ban and normalize American policy 
toward assassination” (Herbert, 1992, p. 133). 
In advancing his argument that assassination has no place in U.S. foreign policy, 
Herbert outlines three arguments favoring ban rescission and six arguments against using 
assassination based on “practical constraints and philosophical complexities” (Herbert, 
1992, p. 120).   His pro-assassination arguments suggest, first that assassination may be 
an effective instrument for waging war in a low intensity conflict, counterinsurgency war, 
or war against terrorists.  The ban “throws out the baby with the bathwater” in absolutely 
denying and making legally ambiguous these warfighting options.  Second, assassination 
serves a greater moral purpose with its precise application of deadly force, limiting 
indiscriminate warfare and thus saving lives.  Additionally, assassination may save 
countless lives if the target is a particularly nefarious individual such as Adolf Hitler or 
Saddam Hussein.   Third, rescinding the ban would send an unambiguous message to the 
U.S.’s enemies and may serve a deterrent purpose (Herbert, 1992, pp. 119-120).   
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Herbert’s anti-assassination arguments declare, first, that assassination is a highly 
complex operation with no guarantee of success.  Second, it is difficult to identify whom 
among the U.S.’s intelligence operatives, military personnel or contracted surrogates 
should carry out an assassination.  Third, there is minimal evidence suggesting an 
assassination will accomplish its designed purpose, given that the outcome cannot be 
guaranteed.  Fourth, it is hard to predict who will fill the target’s position once eliminated 
(in a political or military leader scenario, who would be the successor?); those who 
succeed the assassinated individual may become an even greater threat.  Fifth, an active 
assassination policy may invite retaliation in kind against U.S. leaders.  Sixth, rescinding 
the assassination ban contradicts democratic norms and could erode the U.S.’s global 
credibility as a leader not only in military and economic power, but also in ideals 
(Herbert, 1992, pp. 120-122).   
Herbert recommends policy normalization.  The U.S. should establish some 
measurable standard of action, then use that standard to determine whether an 
assassination is an appropriate action for the situation at hand.  Herbert advocates that 
decision makers avoid using legal frameworks, instead concentrating on America’s 
institutional frameworks for moral judgment.  He uses as an example the Congressional 
policy formulated following the Church committee hearings.  “Congress sought to arrest 
the pattern of executive excesses not by imposing specific constraints, but rather by 
improving the process by which decisions are made” (Herbert, 1992, p. 129).  He cites 
the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, which expanded the 1974 Hughes-Ryan 
Amendment’s reporting procedure requirements to ensure clear lines of authority for 
covert operations.  Herbert feels that normalizing assassination policy with this approach 
will subject assassination issues to governance “by the same institutions, laws and 
guidelines which regulate foreign intervention of any kind,” which supports “the long and 
successful tradition of controlling its leaders through democratic institutions” (Herbert, 
1992, p. 130).  
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Indeed, in the post 9/11 world, the U.S. has normalized its policy, but not in the 
form Herbert suggests.  Rather, the U.S. has normalized assassination policy through the 
current administration’s approach, which includes a highly classified “intelligence 
finding” that formalizes the Bush administration’s guiding principles for the “war on 
terror.”  The ban is still in effect, but the U.S. targets specific personnel for elimination, 
assassination, killing—and whatever the euphemism, the current administration is 
operating in clear violation of its own self-imposed absolute constraints.  In Chapter VI, I 
will address Herbert’s argument that the U.S. should develop a framework for decision 
makers in order to aid in the normalization process of assassination policy.  I will also 
argue in the successive chapters of this thesis that today, over a decade later, several of 
Herbert’s arguments against using assassination as an instrument of foreign policy are 
largely irrelevant or invalid.   
B. DEFINING ASSASSINATION: CONTEXT IS EVERYTHING 
Assassination is not a word that should be used lightly by anyone, due to its 
decidedly iniquitous connotations.  There are many problems in attempting to define 
assassination, especially considering the term carries numerous implications and nuances 
depending on its context.  The difficulty in determining the difference between 
“assassination” and “murder” is similar to the age-old argument as to the differences 
between “terrorist” and “freedom fighter,” or “euthanasia” and “mercy killing.”  Method 
and motivation are differing but overlapping concepts interacting in a complex and 
contradictory world.  Add to this tangle the grey area between peace and war, with the 
subsequent legal and political debate over where in the spectrum of conflict President 
Bush’s declared “War on Terror” belongs, and we have a murky view at best of the role 
assassination plays in foreign policy.   Compounding this problem is the fact that 
Executive Order 12333 bans something it chooses not to define, leaving ample room for 
interpretation, dilution and controversy.   
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines the verb assassinate as, “to injure or 
destroy unexpectedly and treacherously,” or “to murder by sudden or secret attack 
usually for impersonal reasons” (“Assassination,” 2003).  The idea of “treachery” is 
central to much of the negative connotation associated with assassination; it implies 
something intrinsically unfair and deceitful.   
Amnesty International goes further in defining assassination; the organization 
uses the word in context and defines political assassinations as “extrajudicial executions”.  
An extrajudicial execution is an unlawful and deliberate killing carried out 
by order of a government or with its acquiescence. Extrajudicial killings 
10 
are killings which can reasonably be assumed to be the result of a policy at 
any level of government to eliminate specific individuals as an alternative 
to arresting them and bringing them to justice. These killings take place 
outside any judicial framework. (Amnesty International, 2001) 
Obviously, being a human rights organization, Amnesty International stresses the 
“fairness” aspect of assassinations (execution without fair trial).  Their definition is too 
specific and limiting, however, to apply to assassination in modern conflict’s context.  
“Extrajudicial” implies that there is a legal way to bring an individual to justice without 
killing him.  In war and even in some law enforcement scenarios, however, lethal force is 
not only justified but also preferred to bring about resolution to a conflict.   
Numerous scholars and analysts have attempted to tackle assassination’s 
definition, especially in the context of conflict.  General Sir Hugh Beach and David 
Fisher from the International Security Information Service define assassination as, “the 
murder of an important person in a surprise attack for political or religious reasons” 
(Beach & Fisher, 2001).  Bruce Berkowitz defines assassination as “deliberately killing a 
particular person to achieve a military or political objective, using the element of surprise 
to gain an advantage” (Berkowitz, 2003).  Additionally, according to Berkowitz 
assassination knows no rank, and it does not matter how the target is killed.  Kevin A. 
O’Brien illustrates the problems of defining assassination with enough interpretive depth 
to relate to a low intensity conflict or counterinsurgency environment, in his study The 
Use of Assassination as a Tool of State Policy: South Africa’s Counter-Revolutionary 
Strategy 1979-1992.  He sees the key factors in separating assassination from murder as 
“the motivation of the act, the relevance and importance of the target in effecting a 
political outcome through its removal, and the singularity of the target…” (O’Brien, 
1998).  In his contextual approach, O’Brien’s seeks to place a particular act within 
boundaries defined by key elements rather than an absolute classification.   
During an Academic Panel discussion of the purposeful downing of Yamamoto’s 
plane in World War II, Paul B. Woodruff argued that assassination falls outside the 
boundaries presented by theaters of war.  “In an assassination, nonuniformed personnel 
behind the lines gain access by stealth to an enemy leader (who may also be non-
uniformed) and kill him”  (as cited in Herbert, 1992, p.26).  Herbert argues that although 
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Woodruff’s view does describe an assassination scenario, the current ban contains no 
such distinctions and, therefore, cannot be so narrowly defined.  Contextually, the 
Yamamoto action constituted a political assassination.  Herbert also cites Dale Andrade, 
who argues in his book Ashes to Ashes that (in reference to the Vietnam Phoenix 
Program), “The distinction seemed to be that if the attackers did not know the identity of 
those they killed it was war; if they did, it was assassination” (as cited in Herbert, 1992, 
p. 35).  In terms of Woodruff’s view, Berkowitz argues that it does not make a difference 
what the instrument of the assassination is, whether it is a non-uniformed personnel bullet 
(as long as it is not perfidious, outlawed by the conventions of lawful armed conflict), or 
precision-guided munitions launched by a tactical fighter-bomber or a Predator drone, 
armed with Hellfire missiles and loitering overhead unbeknownst to the targeted 
personnel.  In the end, people direct and provide the precision for these killings, no matter 
what weaponry used.  The only real difference is the method and sterility of remote 
versus face-to-face killing.   
Roger Herbert’s views are similar to O’Brien’s.  Herbert contends that it is not 
important to define the term “assassination” especially since the existing ban provides no 
clarifications beyond using the word.  Instead, Herbert establishes boundaries “within 
which a reasonable person might interpret a governmental action to be political 
assassination” that allows the prudent government official to establish criteria “which 
satisfy his colleagues and superiors in government, the American public and his own 
moral standards” (Herbert, 1992, p. 15).  Herbert uses two definitions to establish his 
criteria.  The first, from Franklin Ford, is “the intentional killing of a specified victim or 
group of victims, perpetrated for reasons related to his public prominence and undertaken 
with a political purpose in view” (Ford, 1985, p. 2).  The second definition from David 
Newman and Tyll Van Geel describes assassination as “condoned by a responsible 
official of a sovereign state action expected to influence the policies of another nation” 
(as cited in Herbert, 1992, p. 17).  From these two definitions, Herbert establishes a three-
prong criterion for an action to be considered an assassination:  Authority of a state 
official; intent to influence policies of the targeted national (or sub-national) entity; and, a 
specifically identified victim (Herbert, 1992, p. 18).  If we inject Berkowitz and 
O’Brien’s analysis into the criteria, we can even further enhance the criteria.  Not only do 
12 
assassinations have authority of a state official, but they are also “systemic, systematic, 
planned and executed using elements of a statal structure” (O’Brien, 1998).  “Intent to 
influence policy” addresses the motivational aspect, which O’Brien alludes to, with the 
amplifying goal of achieving a military or political outcome/objective.  Additionally, the 
specifically identified victim “can be anyone from leaders to the lowest common 
denominator” whom the state perceives to be affiliated with a political opponent or 
enemy of the state (O’Brien, 1998).  With these amplifications, my thesis accepts 
Herbert’s framework.  
For the purposes of this thesis, I will define assassination using the following 
criteria.  Assassination is the deliberate killing of a specific individual, regardless of rank 
or political stature, whom the state perceives as an important enough threat to eliminate 
when there is no possibility of capture or judicial recourse.  Assassinations are carried out 
under the authority of a state, and are planned and executed using elements of the state’s 
structure (military, police, intelligence, etc.).  Assassinations occur with the intent and 
motivation to influence or achieve a political or military objective/outcome, regardless of 
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III. U.S. ASSASSINATION POLICY BEFORE 9/11 
A. THE EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
In the aftermath of the Congressional Committee hearings of the mid 1970s, 
President Gerald Ford issued the first Executive Order specifically banning assassination.  
Executive Order 11905, Section 5 (g) stated, “No employee of the United States 
Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, political assassination” (Executive 
Order 11905, 1976).  President Ford also supported additional legislation making 
assassination a crime.  One such piece of legislation was the National Reorganization and 
Reform Act of 1978, S.2525.  Introduced by Senator Walter Huddleston (D-Kentucky) 
and Representative Edward Boland (D-Massachusetts), the act would have specifically 
prohibited the assassination of foreign officials in peacetime.  It was never ratified 
(Herbert, 1992).   
President Carter’s Executive Order 12036, Section 2-305, stated, “No person 
employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or 
conspire to engage in, assassination” (Executive Order 12036, 1978). 
President Reagan was the last president to specifically address assassination in an 
Executive Order, 12333.  Section 2.11 repeats Carter’s verbiage exactly (Executive Order 
12333, 1981).  Although all the Executive Orders contain a specific section dedicated to 
definitions, none of the presidents chose to define assassination. 
B. REAGAN AND ASSASSINATION 
In Bullets with Names, Roger Herbert discusses how Reagan was the first 
president to test the ban, five years after he signed the Executive Order.   On April 15, 
1986, during a period of heightened tensions with Libya, the U.S. launched Operation EL 
DORADO CANYON.  This bombing raid against Libyan infrastructure targets was in 
response to a series of military provocations and Libyan-sponsored terrorist attacks, 
which culminated in a Berlin discotheque bombing that killed three people, including one 
American, and injured some 200 others.  The raid drew criticism and controversy when it 
appeared the U.S. had deliberately targeted Qaddafi; one of the targets was his 
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compound.  Qaddafi escaped harm, but his 15-month-old adopted daughter was killed in 
the raid (Wise, 2003b).  
Despite administration insistence that the raid was not an attempt on 
Qaddafi’s life, many argue that there is reasonable evidence to the 
contrary.  William F. Buckley, Jr., for example, argues that if the raid was 
not, amongst other things, an assassination attempt, ‘then a great many 
people went to unnecessary pains to try to establish exactly where Qaddafi 
would be sleeping on the night of April 14, 1986. (Herbert, 1992, p. 59) 
Then Secretary of State George Schultz stated, “He [Qaddafi] was not a direct target…we 
have a general stance that opposes direct efforts of that kind, and the spirit and intent was 
in accord with those understandings” (as cited in Herbert, 1992, p. 59).  The insinuation 
was that indirect attempts (i.e. “area” weapons such as bombs dropped from aircraft) did 
not constitute a violation of the ban.  This same intimation would surface during the late 
1990s when the Clinton administration similarly tested the limits of the assassination 
prohibition. 
Interestingly, in 1988 the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) promulgated DoD 
Directive 5240.1 (DoD Intelligence Activities).  Paragraph 4.4 of the directive states, 
“Under no circumstances shall any DoD employee engage in, or conspire to engage in, 
assassination” (“DoD Directive”, 1988). 
C. INTERNAL AGITATION 
Meanwhile, the repercussions of the various congressional committee 
investigations proved difficult for the U.S. intelligence community, especially in the area 
of assassination.  The Ford, Carter and Reagan Executive Orders specifically targeted 
CIA operations and severely limited actions during covert operations.   The 1977 
“Halloween Massacre” at the CIA was an administrative purge of literally thousands of 
intelligence officers, mostly from the paramilitary side of covert operations (McClintock, 
1992).  The paranoia resulting from the reforms reverberated all the way to the tactical 
level.  “Even the CIA’s most daring operatives had come to dread the prospect of having 
their careers destroyed for carrying out missions that Congress might later deem illegal” 
(Crile, 2003, p. 14). 
Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the U.S. 
gradually built up its support of the rebel Mujahideen fighters, reaching $1.2 billion in 
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covert aid by its peak in 1986 (Crile, 2003, p. 410).  Despite the enormous amount of 
supplies, equipment and weapons being funneled through Pakistan and into mujahideen 
hands, CIA operatives were extremely cognizant of the limitations that the Executive 
Orders prohibiting assassination imposed on them.  “The Agency’s lawyers, not to 
mention high-ranking officials…were adamant about not becoming involved in anything 
remotely resembling assassination” (Crile, 2003, p. 350).  Although Pakistani Inter-
Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) officers taught Afghan fighters how to identify and 
target higher-ranking Soviet officers, Gust Avrakotos, chief of Afghan operations during 
the mid 1980s, “was careful never to associate the Agency with such activities- that 
would be a political time bomb” (Crile, 2003, p. 350).  John McMahon, Deputy Director 
of Central Intelligence (the CIA’s number two man) from 1982 to 1986, refused to 
provide items such as long-range sniper rifle sights to the mujahideen “out of fear that 
Congress might accuse the CIA of supporting assassination efforts” (Crile, 2003, p. 361).  
It is extremely ironic that while President Reagan was dropping bombs on Libya in the 
hope of killing Qaddafi, the CIA was tying its own covert operators’ hands to avoid 
assassination perceptions in Afghanistan. 
D. BUSH AND ASSASSINATION 
The first President Bush, perhaps sensitive to assassination implications due to his 
reign as head of the beleaguered CIA in 1976-1977, invoked the assassination ban as “a 
specific limiter to actions during the first year of his administration” (Herbert, 1992, p. 
60).  In Bullets with Names, Herbert discusses how President Bush claimed the 
assassination prohibition was an unreasonable restraint for U.S. military officers and 
intelligence operatives in providing support to coup plotters during the failed October 3, 
1989 attempt to overthrow Panamanian dictator General Manuel Noriega (Herbert, 1992).   
If Noriega had been killed during the coup, critics could accuse the U.S. operatives on the 
ground aiding coup leaders of violating the Executive Order.  Following this incident, 
President Bush and the Intelligence Committees determined, “a decision by the President 
to employ overt military force...would not constitute assassination if U.S. forces were 
employed against the combatant forces of another nation, a guerilla force, or a terrorist or 
other organization whose actions pose a threat to the security of the U.S.” (Herbert, 1992, 
p. 135).  Thus the Bush administration added a contextual element to determining 
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whether an action constituted a “banned” assassination; the prohibition would not apply if 
the U.S. engaged various threats to U.S. security with overt military force.    
Despite this contextual qualification, the Bush administration publicly denounced 
any accusation of violating the assassination ban as evidenced by actions and rhetoric 
during Gulf War I, 1990-1991.   After Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, President Bush 
authorized the CIA to make an effort to topple Saddam Hussein.  In his book The 
Commanders, Bob Woodward reports, “The CIA was not to violate the ban on 
assassination attempts, but rather recruit Iraqi dissidents to remove Saddam from power” 
(as cited in Lowry, 2003).  Sensitivity to potential assassination accusations ran high; 
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney fired Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Dugan 
for “telling reporters that the U.S. wanted to ‘decapitate’ the Iraqi regime by killing 
Saddam and his family” (Lowry, 2003).  Cheney stated, “We never talk about the 
targeting of specific individuals who are officials of other governments” (as cited in 
Lowry, 2003).  General Norman Schwartzkopf also announced, “The United States does 
not have a policy of trying to kill any particular individual” (as cited in Herbert, 1992, p. 
62).  Yet none of the rhetoric stopped U.S. forces from repeatedly bombing several of 
Saddam Hussein’s frequented locations and personal compounds throughout the war. 
E. CLINTON AND ASSASSINATION: THE AGITATION CONTINUES 
In his book See No Evil, ex-CIA agent Robert Baer relates an example of the 
politics behind the assassination ban.  Baer was in charge of a clandestine base in 
Northern Iraq in the mid-1990s, and was part of an effort to organize Iraqi dissident 
groups to topple Saddam Hussein.  The effort proved fruitless, however, when the 
Clinton administration pulled the plug on the operation at the last minute in March 1995, 
even after tacitly approving it for months while dissident elements positioned themselves 
for a coup.  According to Baer, the Clinton administration and National Security Advisor 
Tony Lake desired a nonviolent overthrow of Hussein’s regime.  This did not reflect the 
reality of the planned coup, however, and when this news reached the administration, 
Lake personally blocked the operation from proceeding (Baer, 2002, p. 175).   
The story does not end there, however.  In February 1995, Ahmad Chalabi, head 
of the Iraq dissident groups, met with Iranian intelligence officers hoping to acquire 
Iran’s support by persuading the officers that the U.S. was serious about overthrowing 
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Hussein.  To convince them, Chalabi “told the Iranians the U.S. finally had decided to get 
rid of Saddam- to assassinate him.  To carry it out, he said, the National Security Council 
had dispatched an ‘NSC team’ headed by Robert Pope to northern Iraq.  The NSC...had 
asked him to contact the Iranian government on its behalf to ask for help” (Baer, 2002, p. 
6).  Additionally, Chalabi forged a letter, which he deliberately let the Iranians see, that 
asked Chalabi to give this Mr. Pope “all assistance requested for his mission” (Baer, 
2002, p. 6).  U.S. intelligence sources picked up a report of this meeting, and not knowing 
that Chalabi had concocted a lot of bogus information, Tony Lake demanded an 
investigation.   When Baer returned to Langley, FBI agents were waiting to inform him 
he was under investigation for violating Executive Order 12333.  They thought Baer had 
used “Mr. Pope” as an alias, and had ordered Hussein’s assassination.  After shifting the 
allegations to federal murder-for-hire violations under Title 18, sections 1952 and 1958, 
the government eventually dropped the charges.  Baer passed multiple polygraphs and 
there was simply not enough evidence to prosecute him, especially considering that 
Chalabi had invented the whole thing (Baer, 2002, p. 217).  Nonetheless, this was the 
beginning of the end of Baer’s CIA career.  This incident illustrates the sensitivities, 
internal politics, and fear surrounding the Executive Orders’ prohibition on assassination. 
In the late 1990s, President Clinton tested the ban in quite the same way President 
Reagan did in the previous decade.   In 1998, terrorists conducted near-simultaneous 
attacks on the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.  Over 224 
people were killed, including 12 Americans.  The U.S. linked these attacks to the Al-
Qaeda terrorist organization, and two weeks after the bombings President Clinton ordered 
a Tomahawk cruise missile strike against a training camp in Afghanistan and an alleged 
chemical weapons plant in Sudan.  U.S. intelligence sources believed Osama bin Laden 
would be at a meeting at the camp in Afghanistan.  Reportedly, bin Laden was at the 
camp only hours before the strike, but he escaped unharmed (Risen, 2001).  Additionally, 
President Clinton authorized covert actions against bin Laden that included assassination 
as an option.  In an interview with the press shortly after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) 
terrorist attacks, Clinton said, “At the time we did everything we can do. I authorized the 
arrest and, if necessary, the killing of Osama bin Laden and we actually made contact 
with a group in Afghanistan to do it” (Younge, 2001).  The Clinton administration overtly 
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used indirect methods (albeit with more precision than the Libya strikes) in targeting 
areas where an individual may have been during the cruise missile attacks.  In this way 
they used the same reasoning as the Reagan administration in avoiding implicit violation 
of the assassination prohibition.   Clinton, however, did go a step further in authorizing 
covert operations targeting an individual (bin Laden) for assassination.  Clinton’s lawyers 
determined that the U.S. could go after bin Laden without violating Executive Order 
12333, concluding “that efforts to hunt and kill bin Laden were defensible either as acts 
of war or as national self defense, legitimate under both American and international law” 
(Risen, 2001). 
F. CONGRESS STEPS IN 
Interestingly, well prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Representative Bob Barr (R-
Georgia) introduced a bill known as the “Terrorist Elimination Act of 2001.”  Submitted 
as H.R. 19 on January 3, 2001, the bill’s purpose was “to nullify the effect of certain 
provisions of various Executive orders,” specifically orders 11905, 12036, and 12333.  In 
the bill, Barr proposed the following findings: 
(1) Past Presidents have issued Executive orders which severely limit the 
use of the military when dealing with potential threats against the United 
States of America; 
(2) These Executive orders limit the swift, sure, and precise action needed 
by the United States to protect our national security;  
(3) Present strategy allows the military forces to bomb large targets hoping 
to eliminate a terrorist leader, but prevents our country from designing a 
limited action which would specifically accomplish that purpose;  
(4) On several occasions the military has been ordered to use a military 
strike hoping, in most cases unsuccessfully, to remove a terrorist leader 
who has committed crimes against the United States;  
(5) As the threat from terrorism grows, America must continue to 
investigate effective ways to combat the menace posed by those who 
would murder American citizens simply to make a political point; and  
(6) Actions by the United States Government to remove such persons is 
[sic] a remedy which should be used sparingly and considered only after 
all other reasonable options have failed or are not available; however, this 
is an option our country must maintain for cases in which international 
threats cannot be eliminated by other means. (H.R. 19, 2001)  
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Barr proposed nullifying all portions of Ford, Carter, and Reagan’s Executive Orders that 
refer to prohibition of assassination.  Initially, Barr had no co-sponsors for his bill.  After 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, however, 15 other House Representatives joined Barr in 
sponsoring the bill and it was referred to the Committee on International Relations.  
According to congressional records, the referral was the last major action taken on this 
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IV. U.S. ASSASSINATION POLICY AFTER 9/11 
A. THE DAY THE WORLD CHANGED 
On the morning of September 11, 2001, transnational terrorists belonging to the 
al-Qaeda organization took control of four commercial passenger jets.  The terrorists 
crashed a plane into each of the World Trade Center’s twin towers, crashed another plane 
into the Pentagon, and crashed the fourth plane into a field in Pennsylvania after 
passengers struggled with the terrorist for control.  All told, the attacks claimed the lives 
of 3,981 people in the worst single terrorist incident in U.S. history.  America’s resolve in 
dealing with terrorists hardened in the face of these attacks, and assassination 
immediately surfaced as a potential option in responding to terrorist threats.  This chapter 
will address the changes to U.S. assassination policy since 9/11. 
On September 15, 2001, the U.S. Congress overwhelmingly authorized President 
Bush  
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, 
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or 
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts 
of international terrorism against the United states by such nations, 
organizations or persons. (“Congress approves,” 2001)   
The resolution passed by a 420-1 margin, with the lone dissenter being Representative 
Barbara Lee (D-California), who felt it gave too much of Congress’ power to the 
president and force could make things worse (“Congress approves,” 2001).   The 
resolution clearly gave President Bush broad power and authority to target specific 
individuals involved in the terrorist attacks with lethal force, if “necessary and 
appropriate.”  The Bush administration did not, however, change Executive Order 12333 
to lift the assassination prohibition.     
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Despite Congress giving President Bush what appeared to be a “blank check” in 
prosecuting the war on terror, U.S. intelligence and military actions since 9/11 have 
continued to fuel the assassination debate.  The U.S. is now engaged in both overt and 
covert action against enemies worldwide, and several of the operations have been high-
profile assassination attempts, both successful and unsuccessful.  The U.S. has 
determined that sub-national terrorists, no matter what their position in their respective 
organizations, are “enemy combatants,” and thus legitimate targets of lethal force in the 
“war on terror.”  Likewise, the leaders of enemy nations’ combatant forces, such as 
Saddam Hussein, have been clearly targeted.  There has been no attempt to deny the 
intent of such action, as was common with previous administrations.  Even so, the Bush 
administration has maintained that all of their actions are within the boundaries of 
international law and the law of armed conflict, and thus do not violate the assassination 
ban. 
B. BUSH (GEORGE W.) AND ASSASSINATION 
Immediately following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, President Bush signed a secret 
intelligence finding; a legal document authorizing covert action.  The finding provided 
“the basic executive and legal authority for the CIA to either kill or capture terrorist 
leaders.  Initially, the CIA used that authority to search for al-Qaeda leaders in 
Afghanistan” (Risen & Johnston, 2002).  The finding also included a “hit list” of 
terrorists that the CIA was “authorized to kill if capture is impractical and civilian 
casualties can be minimized” (Risen & Johnston, 2002).   The finding gave broad 
authority to the CIA to kill or capture al-Qaeda operatives worldwide; targets were not 
limited to the names on the list, and the president did not have to personally approve each 
operation or additions to the list (Risen & Johnston). Reportedly, after the initial finding, 
the CIA expanded the target list and “developed formal rules of engagement for its 
targeted-killing operations…designed…to make sure that any covert killings comport 
with U.S. law and with the ‘customary rules of armed conflict’ that are a recognized part 
of international law under the 1907 Hague Convention and the 1949 Geneva Convention” 
(McManus, 2003).   
On the military side, Defense Department lawyers determined assassination 
would not be illegal under the Law of War if the targets were “combatant forces of 
another nation, a guerilla force, or a terrorist or other organization whose actions pose a 
threat to the security of the United States” (Hersh, 2002).    If this rationale looks 
familiar, it should; in Chapter III, I discussed the first President Bush’s issues with the 
assassination prohibition during the Panama conflict.  He and his advisors used the exact 
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same criteria when they decided what would justify assassination, without violating the 
Executive Order’s prohibition.    
The CIA and Department of Defense used their newfound authority liberally 
when tracking down terrorists during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan.  
It was a slow start, however, as many of the Clinton-era intelligence and military officials 
struggled with their unprecedented lack of restrictions after years of paranoia and risk 
aversion.  On one of the first nights of the war in Afghanistan, a Predator UAV equipped 
with Hellfire missiles located a convoy of vehicles believed to be carrying Mullah Omar, 
leader of the Taliban.  The convoy stopped in front of some buildings and the occupants 
of the vehicle got out, entering a building that happened to be located next to a mosque.  
Central Command, in charge of the effort on the ground, agonized over whether to 
engage the targets.  In the end Central Command aborted the strike due to concerns over 
collateral damage and accuracy of intelligence.  Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
was not happy with the hesitance and reluctance to act.  He adjusted the rules of 
engagement to make things easier for commanders, if another opportunity to assassinate a 
high value target presented itself (Thomas & Klaidman, 2003).  
In November 2001, U.S. military and intelligence sources tracked Osama bin 
Laden’s military chief, Muhammed Atef, to a house near Kabul, Afghanistan, where he 
was meeting with other al-Qaeda officials.  A Predator circled overhead while U.S. F/A-
18s bombed the site.  When personnel attempted to flee the building, the UAV engaged 
them with Hellfire missiles.   Atef was killed in the strike (Samson, 2002).   
Some of the assassination operations were not without controversy.  In December 
2001, a U.S. air strike targeted a convoy of vehicles that the U.S. military believed was 
carrying high-ranking al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders.  The strike destroyed the convoy, 
but Afghans claimed the vehicles were carrying regional tribal elders into Kabul for new 
president Hamid Karzai’s swearing in as head of the interim Afghan government.   The 
U.S. stood behind the attack, but Afghans said rival tribes fed false information to the 
U.S. military (“Survivors Say,” 2001).   
In February 2002, a Predator UAV on patrol in the skies above Afghanistan 
captured video of a tall man, being “treated with deference” by a small group of people, 
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who CIA and military officers believed could be Osama bin Laden.  The U.S. officers 
made a request through their chain of command to engage the personnel with The UAV’s 
Hellfire missiles.  By the time the strike was approved, the group had dispersed.  The 
Predator soon captured more images of what appeared to be the same tall man walking 
out of a wooded area, and U.S. officials gave the go-ahead to the Predator.  The Predator 
fired its Hellfire missiles, decimating the area and killing three people.  Although the 
Pentagon maintained the men were al-Qaeda, villagers in the area claimed they were 
local men scavenging for scrap metal (Hersh, 2002).   In May 2002, a CIA Predator 
attempted to assassinate Afghan Warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (once a major recipient 
of U.S. aid in the Soviet-Afghan war) with Hellfire missiles, but was unsuccessful 
(Landay, 2002).   
Despite some controversy, all of the actions mentioned so far occurred in 
Afghanistan, clearly in a theater of war and against individuals the U.S. believed were 
enemy leaders.  The operations were acknowledged by most (including international 
human rights groups) as legitimate targeting of “enemy combatants.”  The outlying case 
that provoked another round of assassination debate was the U.S. Predator UAV strike on 
November 3, 2002, in Yemen, that killed al-Qaeda operative Abu Ali al-Harithi.    
C. YEMEN: THE U.S. BREAKS THE PARADIGM 
The U.S. and Yemeni authorities had long sought al-Harithi as a primary suspect 
in the October 12, 2000 bombing of the USS COLE in Aden harbor that killed 17 U.S. 
sailors.  He was also believed to have served as one of Osama bin Laden’s bodyguards 
(Landay, 2002).  In December 2000, Yemeni Special Forces attempted to capture a group 
of al-Qaeda operatives, including al-Harithi, near the Yemen-Saudi Arabia border.  The 
mission was a disaster; the suspects escaped and 18 Yemeni soldiers were killed (Bowers 
& Smucker, 2002).  A joint U.S./Yemeni intelligence team had been tracking al-Harithi’s 
whereabouts, and had pinpointed his location (using one of his five cellular phones) in a 
remote desert location in the Marib province.  On November 3, 2002, a Predator UAV, 
launched from nearby Djibouti, located al-Harithi’s vehicle and launched a Hellfire 
missile into it, completely destroying the car and its occupants.  Besides al Harithi, the 
strike killed four men belonging to the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army, a terrorist group with 
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ties to Al-Qaeda, and one Arab-American from Buffalo, New York who according to the 
FBI recruited for Al-Qaeda (Hersh, 2002).   
The Yemen strike sparked immediate international controversy, though 
domestically, U.S. citizens and media, as evidenced by the overwhelmingly positive 
coverage at the time, widely supported the operation.   Although only briefly described 
here, the Yemen episode will appear frequently in the remainder of the thesis.  This 
action was clearly a step in an entirely different direction taken by any previous 
administration, and serves as a particularly illustrative example of the tensions 
surrounding U.S. assassination policy 
D. IRAQ: TARGETING THE HUSSEINS 
Assassination policy debate continued most recently during the ongoing war in 
Iraq.  Prior to the war, Senator Peter Fitzgerald (R-Illinois) told the Chicago Daily Herald 
that in a conversation with President Bush, the president had said he would rescind 
Executive Order 12333 if U.S. forces “had a clear shot” at Saddam Hussein (“U.S. 
Ducks,” 2003).  White House spokesman Ari Fleisher sidestepped press questions but 
stopped short of total denial, saying, “The president doesn’t recall if he said it or didn’t 
say it.  The staff doesn’t recall the president saying it…I think there is some uncertainty 
in Senator Fitzgerald’s mind about it” (“U.S. Ducks,” 2003).    
From the beginning of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, however, there was no 
doubt the U.S. targeted Saddam Hussein and his regime leaders in “decapitation attacks,” 
firing Tomahawk missiles and dropping precision guided munitions on known leadership 
and command/control locations.  On April 8, 2003, a U.S. Air Force B-1 bomber received 
orders to bomb a residence in Baghdad where intelligence sources suspected Hussein and 
at least 20 other regime leaders were gathered.  Twelve minutes later the B-1 dropped 
four 2,000 lb bombs, leaving a smoking, 60-foot deep crater where the residence once 
stood (Zoroya, 2003).  Apparently, however, Saddam escaped death.  Ironically, no one 
was fired for his or her “decapitation” remarks this time, despite Dick Cheney’s position 
as Vice President. 
The killing of Uday and Qusay Hussein again sparked debate over U.S. 
assassination policy.  Uday and Qusay, Saddam Hussein’s particularly nefarious sons, 
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were the “Ace of Hearts” and the “Ace of Clubs,” respectively, in the U.S. forces’ “Most 
Wanted” Deck of Cards.  The Hussein brothers had been at large since Hussein’s regime 
dissolved when U.S. forces reached Baghdad in early April 2003, and Uday and Qusay 
were the subject of an intense manhunt by Task Force 20 (Thomas & Nordland, 2003).  
Uday and Qusay had hidden themselves in the Mosul mansion belonging to an import-
export businessman, Nawaf al-Zaidan.  Al-Zaidan tipped off the Hussein brothers’ 
location to U.S. forces, and on the morning of July 22, 2003, Task Force 20 arrived, 
backed up by elements of the 101st Airborne Division.  Task Force 20 attempted to get 
Uday and Qusay to surrender, calling to them on a bullhorn before entering the building.  
As they attempted to climb the stairs inside the residence, a hail of gunfire repelled the 
U.S. commandos, and three soldiers were wounded.  Task Force 20 retreated and turned 
the operation over to the 101st Airborne Division’s Strike Brigade, who proceeded to 
“prep” the building from all sides with .50 caliber machine gun fire, grenades, and 
helicopter-fired missiles.  Around noon U.S. soldiers attempted to enter the building, and 
were again repulsed by small arms fire.  After another hour of intense fire and 
bombardment, and six hours after the initial engagement, U.S. forces finally gained entry 
into the mansion, and found Uday, Qusay, a bodyguard and Mustafa (Qusay’s teenage 
son) dead from multiple bullet and shrapnel wounds (Thomas & Nordland, 2003).     
Following the killings, Congressman Charlie Rangel (D-New York) argued, “We 
have a law on the books that the United States should not be assassinating anybody...We 
tried to assassinate Castro and we paid dearly for it...and when you personalize the war 
and you say you're killing someone's kids, then they, in turn, think they can kill 
somebody” (as cited in “Rangel: U.S.,” 2003).  Associated Press writer George Gedda 
commented, “Pursuing with intent to kill violates a long-standing policy banning political 
assassinations…It was the misfortune of Saddam Hussein’s sons…that the Bush 
administration has not bothered to enforce the prohibition” (as cited in Yoo, 2003).  
Others argued that Uday and Qusay were legitimate targets of lethal force in an armed 
conflict.  “It is perfectly legitimate for the United States to kill Hussein’s sons…just as it 
is to kill members of the Iraqi military who continue to fight against the coalition…who 
are enemy combatants in a war with the United States” (Yoo, 2003).  
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The assassination operations in Iraq have not been without error.  On April 10, 
2003 (the day Baghdad fell), U.S. jets destroyed a house in Ramadi with six precision-
guided bombs.  U.S. forces were acting on a tip that Saddam Hussein’s half brother, 
Barzan Tikriti, was at the residence.  Instead, the U.S. killed one of the area’s tribal 
leaders, Malik Kharbit (who owned the house), and members of his family (Ignatius, 
2003).   
C. CARRYING BARR’S TORCH 
There have been additional attempts by lawmakers to do away with Executive 
Order 12333’s restrictions.  On January 27, 2003, Representative Terry Everett (R-
Alabama), introduced H.R. 356, the “Terrorist Elimination Act of 2003,” which closely 
mirrored Representative Bob Barr’s bill detailed in Chapter III.  It presented almost 
exactly the same findings, and sought to nullify “Section 2.11 of Executive Order 12333, 
and any comparable provisions contained in any other Executive order, regulation, or 
other order of a department or agency of the executive branch” (H.R. 356, 2003).  With 
just two co-sponsors, the bill was, as with Barr’s case, referred to the House’s Committee 
on International Relations.   The referral was the last known action taken on the bill (Bill 
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V. ASSASSINATION POLICY TENSIONS 
A. THE MURKY WATERS 
The purpose of this Chapter is to examine the assassination debate in terms of 
tensions that arise when the U.S. conducts an assassination operation (or what is 
perceived as an assassination) despite the explicit prohibition of Executive Order 12333 
and its predecessors.  In Bullets With Names, Roger Herbert conducted a thorough 
analysis of these tensions.  He concluded that although assassination has no place in U.S. 
foreign policy, Executive Order 12333 is dysfunctional and assassination policy requires 
normalization.  A decade later, however, in the post 9/11 world, assassination—as 
defined by both Herbert in Bullets With Names and myself in Chapter II—is not only a 
valuable tool but also is now considered by some military analysts and leaders as a vital 
and practical option in the war on terror.  
Before wading into the murky waters of assassination debate and tensions, it is 
important to note that none of the administrations, since President Ford issued the first 
Executive Order, has debated the ban in terms of assassinating foreign political leaders or 
heads of state in peacetime.  With the one exception of the second President Bush’s 
“unconfirmed” statement regarding Saddam Hussein (who arguably has been in a 
perpetual state of conflict with the U.S. since the first Gulf War) detailed in Chapter IV, 
the U.S. has abided fairly closely by not only the letter but also the spirit of the Executive 
Order, in the context of eliminating foreign political adversaries without a pre-existing 
state of overt conflict.  The U.S. has violated the explicit and absolute prohibition, 
however, in the milieu of “hostilities,” overt and covert armed conflict, and the nebulous 
battleground of the current “war on terror.” 
To set the stage for the policy tensions discussion, it is useful to examine the 
controversy surrounding the November 3, 2002 Yemen assassination mentioned in 
Chapter IV.  The Yemen killings provide an ideal case study for U.S. assassination policy 
tensions.  The strike occurred outside of any specific arena of conflict and involved many 
controversial factors.  On November 8, 2002, Amnesty International wrote letters to 
President Bush and the President of Yemen, voicing the organization’s concerns over the 
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Predator strike.  As outlined in Chapter II, Amnesty International defines assassinations 
as extra-judicial executions.  In their press release announcing the letters, Amnesty 
International said, “If this was the deliberate killing of suspects in lieu of arrest, in 
circumstances in which they did not pose an immediate threat, the killings would be 
extra-judicial executions in violation of international human rights law” (“Amnesty 
International,” 2002).   Amnesty International also suggested the U.S. issue a statement 
saying they do not sanction such extra-judicial executions, bring any U.S. officials 
involved in such action to justice, and provide full explanation of the role of U.S. 
personnel in the killing of the six men.  Additionally, although Amnesty International 
“recognizes the obligation of the United States Government to protect its nationals…the 
prohibition against the arbitrary deprivation of life cannot be derogated from in any 
circumstances, even in a time of national emergency” (Amnesty International Press 
Release, 2002). 
Anna Lindh, Sweden’s foreign minister (recently herself a victim of 
assassination), argued the strike was “a summary execution that violates human rights” 
(as cited in Dworkin, 2002).  An unnamed former Clinton administration official warned 
the U.S. was in danger of becoming, “in fact or perception, judge, jury and executioner 
around the world” (Dworkin, 2002).   
National Security Advisor Condaleeza Rice responded to concerns and criticism 
after the attack, saying, “We’re in a new kind of war, and we’ve made it very clear that 
this new kind of war be fought on different battlefields…the President has given broad 
authority to U.S. officials in a variety of circumstances to do what they need to do to 
protect the country” (as cited in Dworkin, 2002).  
Surprisingly, Human Rights Watch did not totally agree with Amnesty 
International’s view. 
Based on the limited information available, Human Rights Watch did not 
criticize the attack on al-Harethi as an extra-judicial execution because his 
alleged al-Qaeda role arguably made him a combatant, the government 
apparently lacked control over the area in question, and there evidently 
was no reasonable law enforcement alternative. Indeed, eighteen Yemeni 
soldiers had reportedly been killed in a prior attempt to arrest al-Harethi. 
(“Human Rights,” 2003) 
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The organization did argue, however, that the U.S. made no attempt to officially justify 
this “war power” use or identify the legal limits of targeted killing of enemy combatants. 
It is Human Rights Watch's position that even someone who might be 
classified as an enemy combatant should not be subject to military attack 
when reasonable law enforcement means are available. The failure to 
respect this principle would risk creating a huge loophole in due process 
protections worldwide. It would leave everyone open to being summarily 
killed anyplace in the world upon the unilateral determination by the 
United States (or, as the approach is inevitably emulated, by any other 
government) that he or she is an enemy combatant. (“Human Rights,” 
2003) 
An October 16, 2003 Frontline episode highlighted another wrinkle in the Yemen 
assassination.  As I mentioned in Chapter IV, one of the people killed was an Arab-
American.  His name was Kamal Derwish, and his assassination represented “the first 
public instance of an American citizen killed by the U.S. government in the course of its 
hunt for Al Qaeda. The attack in Yemen sets a new precedent, whether Derwish was 
killed intentionally or as the result of collateral damage” (“Frontline: Chasing,” 2003).  
Derwish’s passport, found near the scene, was reportedly used to aid in the identification 
of his body, apparently still burning when Yemeni officials arrived on the scene.  
Although most U.S. officials, including Dale Watson (head of the FBI’s counterterrorism 
division following 9/11) and Robert Mueller (head of the FBI), refused during interviews 
to acknowledge any awareness of Derwish’s disposition, Secretary of Homeland 
Security, Tom Ridge, did have some interesting comments.  He did acknowledge 
Derwish’s death and confirmed Derwish was the subject of discussion within the Bush 
administration.  In reference to the Yemen operation and the hard decisions behind it, 
Ridge said, 
...the decision to engage that vehicle or to engage militarily or using any 
military assets, those are decisions made by other individuals and other 
entities outside of Homeland Security. Make no mistake about it, I don't 
think anybody in the government, in terms of prosecuting the war -- as 
horrible as these terrorists are and the tragedy that befell upon us on 9/11 
and, whatever we feel about them -- still considers it an easy thing to take 
somebody's life. But if that's what you have to do, under these 
circumstances of 9/11, to protect America, that's what we have to do. 
(“Frontline: Chasing,” 2003) 
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These are extremely complex decisions, especially when faced with “pulling the trigger” 
on an American citizen, albeit an active terrorist recruiter with alleged ties to al-Qaeda.  
Obviously, the implications of the U.S. killing one of its own citizens (on foreign soil), 
without due process or an attempt at apprehension, are enormous.  If we give the U.S. 
government the benefit of the doubt, Derwish was simply in the wrong place, at the 
wrong time.  Otherwise, the U.S. enters the dangerous territory of extrajudicial execution, 
untenable by any standards of a democratic society upholding the rule of law. 
Dissecting the contextual nuances of the Yemen assassination helps illustrate the 
policy tensions that arise in these cases.  First of all, the Yemen operation fits into our 
definition of an assassination as outlined in Chapter II.  It was a deliberate killing of a 
specific individual (Predator UAV-launched Hellfire missile, at Abu Ali al-Harithi and 
his cohorts); the state(s) (U.S. and Yemen) perceived al-Harithi as an important enough 
threat to eliminate when there was no possibility of capture or judicial recourse (a 
previous attempt at capture resulted in the death of 18 Yemeni special forces soldiers, and 
according to reports, he was either planning for or on his way to another attack); it was 
carried out under the authority of a state, and planned and executed using elements of the 
state’s structure (U.S. and Yemen joint intelligence assets and operatives); it occurred 
with the intent and motivation to influence or achieve a political or military 
objective/outcome (self-defense, elimination of a imminent/potential threat, symbolic 
warning to all terrorists demonstrating the U.S.’s global reach); it happened regardless of 
whether the state is considered at “war” or “peace” with its perceived enemies (the U.S. 
was not at war with Yemen, but the Bush administration had declared war on terror).   
B. MORAL AND ETHICAL DEBATE 
The moral (right vs. wrong) arguments surrounding assassination policy lie 
distinctly along two lines of thought.  As Bruce Berkowitz remarks, “The morality of 
sanctioned assassination depends mainly on whether and when one can justify murder” 
(Berkowitz, 2002).  On the one side are those who agree with Amnesty International, 
Anna Lindh, and syndicated columnist Marianne Means, who argued, “State-ordered, 
premeditated killing across borders without judicial due process is morally wrong” 
(Means, 2001).  Richard Lowry counters this perspective, saying it is “...a moral 
equivalence that condemns us for trying to kill first the people who are bent on killing us.  
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It finds it intolerable that we might engage in any difficult or severe action in the course 
of defeating our mortal enemies…” (Lowry, 2003).  Lowry also argues, “Targeted killing 
can also be morally superior to waging all-out war…Indeed, the idea of proportionality in 
the law of war suggests that the means able to achieve an objective with the least 
destruction…is always to be preferred” (Lowry, 2003).    
Professor of philosophy Daniel Statman expresses an even more precise view in 
his article “The Legitimacy of Targeted Killing.”   He says,  
Targeted Killing expresses the appropriate respect for life during 
wartime…In Targeted Killing, human beings are not killed because they 
are ‘the enemy’ but because they bear special responsibility or play a 
special role in the enemy’s aggression.  This is particularly true in war 
against terrorism, where those targeted are personally responsible for 
atrocities against innocent lives. (Statman, 2002) 
Lowry and Statman share similar views to Representatives Barr and Everett, who were 
concerned that the prohibition on assassination contained in Executive Order 12333 
caused U.S. military forces to use far less precise methods to eliminate terrorists, rather 
than conducting a limited action that would specifically achieve that objective.   George 
Washington University law professor Jonathan Turley advances a similar argument; “It is 
time to revisit the idea of limited use of assassination to save lives and combat 
terrorism...the ban on assassination actually encourages the use of military strikes, which 
don’t simply kill the targeted individual but also cause collateral damage” (as cited in 
“Political Assassination,” 2001).  
Ethically (right vs. right), assassination may seem like the most precise and moral 
application of force.  However, in most cases the world community would perceive other 
options, such as capture, as more judicious.  Favoring assassination may cause the U.S. to 
lose its status as the world’s premier example of democratic idealism.  As a recently 
retired Special Forces colonel (quoted in Seymour Hersh’s New Yorker article) 
commented, “It is not unlawful, but ethics is about what we ought to do in our position as 
the most powerful country in human history...global assassinations done by the 
military...define who we are and what we want to become as a nation.  Unintended 
consequences are huge...the perception of a global vigilante force knocking off the 
enemies of the U.S. cannot be controlled...” (Hersh, 2002).   Ethically, global perception 
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should not constrain actions if a precision, targeted attack will guarantee minimal loss of 
life on both sides of a conflict.  The difficulty lies in accurately predicting the outcome. 
C. LEGAL DEBATE 
Deconstructing the legal tensions evident in the examination of the Yemen 
assassination is an extremely complicated endeavor.   The strike took place in a foreign 
country far from what was considered the front lines of the war on terror (at the time, 
Afghanistan).  The U.S. was not at war with Yemen; in fact, the two countries have been 
active (albeit uneasy) partners in the war on terror since the bombing of the USS COLE 
in 2000.  The U.S. did not give al-Harithi and his cohorts a chance to surrender; in fact, 
the vehicle’s occupants did not even know they were under attack until perhaps a fleeting 
second prior to their vaporization by a Hellfire missile.  Perhaps most significantly, the 
strike was conducted by neither a military nor law enforcement entity (the CIA is a 
governmental intelligence organization), and the personnel targeted were not members of 
a state military organization or formally indicted criminals.  These circumstances place 
the Yemen operation squarely in an ambiguous and obscure area virtually untouched by 
traditional law conventions. 
Domestically, the Executive Order specifically prohibiting assassination has the 
force of law for all those operating under the U.S. government (Pape, 2002, p. 65).  
Surprisingly, there are no international laws specifically prohibiting or even addressing 
assassination (Berkowitz, 2002).  There are four international agreements, however, that 
the international community and legal experts have historically interpreted to encompass 
assassination issues.  The first is the U.N. Charter, which encourages peaceful settlement 
of disputes.  Article 2(4) of the Charter states, “All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state” (“Charter,” 1945).  Assassinations would normally 
fall into this prohibitive category.  However, Article 51 of the Charter states, “Nothing in 
the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence 
if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations” (“Charter,” 1945).   
The U.S. and Israel have repeatedly invoked this provision when conducting retaliatory 
or “preemptive” strikes against enemy leaders or individual terrorists who have planned, 
sponsored, or participated in attacks against them.  When the U.S. conducted strikes 
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against Libya in 1986, President Reagan’s Legal Advisor, Abraham Saofer, argued the 
justification lay in “striking back to prevent further attacks” (Pape, 2002, p. 67). 
The second international agreement that touches on assassination issues is the 
1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally 
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents.  Intended to ensure governments could 
function and negotiate during war, the treaty “bans attacks against heads of state while 
they conduct formal functions, heads of government while they travel abroad, and 
diplomats while they perform their duties” (Berkowitz, 2002).  International law experts 
agree, however, that once armed conflict begins, heads of state who have tactical control 
over their armed forces are legitimate targets for lethal force (Weinstein, 2003).  Terrorist 
organizations pose challenges to international law conventions, especially when 
attempting to determine where terrorist organizations, their members and their actions fit 
under international law’s purview.  The 1973 Convention only applies to “officials 
representing bona fide governments and ‘international organizations of an 
intergovernmental character,’” which would not include members of terrorist groups such 
as al-Qaeda (Berkowitz, 2002). 
The third international agreement is the Hague Convention of 1907, which the 
international community still uses as the standard to define the “rules of war.”  Article 
23b of the Convention states, “It is especially forbidden to kill or wound treacherously 
individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army” (“Hague Convention”, 1907).  The 
Convention, however, does not define “treachery,” and further obfuscates the issue under 
Article 24, which permits “ruses of war” (“Hague”).   
National Review editor Richard Lowry believes the general hesitance to endorse 
assassinations today is due to misunderstanding in interpreting the Hague.  This argument 
brings us back to the “treachery” connotation introduced in Chapter II’s definitions 
discussion.    If an assassination could be considered “unlawful” under the conventions of 
armed conflict, it would have to be conducted using treacherous means.  Lowry uses the 
pre-9/11 killing of Afghanistan Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Massoud as a classic 
case of treachery.  Two of Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda operatives posed as journalists 
seeking an interview with Massoud.  When they finally got close enough, they detonated 
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explosives packed inside their video camera case, killing themselves and Massoud.   
Lowry argues that when critics consider assassination issues, however, they use a much 
too broad perception of treachery, including any covert or clandestine operation involving 
precision or stealth (Lowry, 2003).   
The fourth international agreement is the Geneva Convention, which is actually a 
series of conventions codifying multiple aspects of war including treatment of wounded, 
prisoners of war, and protection of civilians.  “Protocol I Additional,” a 1977 expansion 
to the Geneva Convention of 1949 sought to protect civilians by distinguishing 
combatants from the population; “lawful” combatants had to either wear a uniform or 
carry their weapons openly.  Otherwise, they would lose their status and protection, if 
captured, as enemy prisoners of war.   The Protocol also prohibits perfidious killing, 
injury, or capture.  It defines perfidy as “acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to 
lead him to believe that he is entitled to, obliged to accord, protection under the rules of 
international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence” 
(“Protocol Additional,” 1977).  Analysts and legal experts have seen this Protocol as 
overly constrictive to covert operations. 
At times, the nature of assassination may require an operative to mislead 
an enemy’s confidence in order to execute an assassination…These 
provisions…would clearly hamper any covert operation including 
operations which required operatives to commit assassinations behind 
enemy lines…If the United States was forced to adhere to such a stringent 
provision, the U.S. would be forced to limit its options in defending U.S. 
interests abroad. (Moon, 1997)   
The U.S. has never ratified the additional protocols (“States Party,” 2003). 
The U.S. has incorporated many of the Hague and Geneva Conventions’ 
principles into U.S, military law of war, and has sought to clarify some of the hazy areas.  
The U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 27-10 (“The Law of Land Warfare”) gives treachery 
a detailed treatment, using perfidy as a benchmark for unacceptable conduct.  Any 
method used to gain “an advantage of the enemy by deliberate lying or misleading 
conduct which involves a breach of faith” would qualify as treachery or perfidy (“FM 27-
10,” 1956).  Also, according to FM 27-10, the Hague’s “treachery” clause, “…is 
construed as prohibiting assassination, proscription, or outlawry of an enemy, or putting a 
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price upon an enemy's head, as well as offering a reward for an enemy “dead or alive.”  It 
does not, however, preclude attacks on individual soldiers or officers of the enemy 
whether in the zone of hostilities, occupied territory or elsewhere” (“FM 27-10” 1956).  
Additionally, when discussing killing the enemy, the U.S. Army Memorandum of Law 
states, “No distinction is made between an attack accomplished by aircraft, missile, naval 
gunfire, artillery, mortar, infantry assault, ambush…booby trap, a single shot by a sniper, 
a commando attack, or other similar means” (Lowry, 2003). 
Berkowitz argues, “the main legal constraints on sanctioned assassination other 
than domestic law, which makes murder a crime in almost all countries, are rules that 
nations impose on themselves” (Berkowitz, 2002).  The U.S. is the only country to have 
imposed such a prohibition, currently in the form Executive Order 12333.  St. Mary’s 
University Law Professor Jeffrey Addicott argues, “…Executive Order 12333 really does 
not make ‘illegal’ something that was not already illegal” (Addicott, 2002).   In other 
words, if assassination is indeed yet another form of murder, then the Executive Order is 
purely a policy statement rather than actual law.   However, there is a major disconnect 
between U.S. policy and practice.  “In short, the unintended result of banning 
assassinations has been to make U.S. leaders perform verbal acrobatics to explain how 
they have tried to kill someone in a military operation without really trying to kill him” 
(Berkowitz, 2002). 
The Yemen case reflects the difficulties in determining ground rule for the war on 
terror, a war that has no solid foundation in traditional war conventions.  Self-defense is 
invoked repeatedly, but questions regarding the imminence of the threat arise when 
terrorists are killed in the middle of a vast desert, with no potential targets anywhere near 
the area.  Suzanne Spaulding, chair of the American Bar Association Standing Committee 
on Law and National Security, commented, “The strike in Yemen highlights the difficulty 
of applying traditional rules of engagement to this non-traditional war…the U.S. 
government has not adequately explained the parameters of this war…including the 
definition of the enemy and what counts as a legitimate military target” (as cited in 
Dworkin, 2002).  Spaulding did, however, acknowledge the concept of engaging enemy 
combatants in the war on terror; “It does seem to me this was characterized as a military 
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operation in the war on terrorism- not a rhetorical war- and that these are enemy 
combatants.  You shoot to kill enemy combatants” (as cited in Hess, 2002). 
Classifying terrorists as enemy combatants is a technically contentious issue, 
producing charges of policy duplicity.  Captured enemy terrorists, interned at U.S. 
facilities in Guantanemo Bay, are not afforded the rights and protections of prisoners of 
war.  The U.S. argues they are “illegal combatants,” since the terrorists are not operating 
under the laws of war and are thus not protected by the conventions.  Although U.S. 
officials declined to comment on the details of the Yemen operation, the status of the 
terrorists as combatants is arguable.  The very definition of the term “terrorist” also 
produces tension in assassination policy.  The U.S., in classifying terrorists as 
combatants, is justified in targeting individual terrorists with lethal force.  Many nations 
(including the U.S. prior to 9/11), however, view terrorists as civilians and terrorism as a 
criminal act, thus subject to criminal law proceedings.  Using lethal force against 
terrorists without due process could then be interpreted as a violation of domestic and 
international law (Thiermann & Messing, 2002).   This legal gray area is truly central to 
the assassination debate.  The “war on terror’ is largely rhetorical since declaring war on 
an organization or sub-state actors, or a tactic of these entities, defies current international 
law definitions and convention.  The closest fit in international law are those described by 
the Geneva Convention as “enemies of mankind”—pirates, robbers, outlaws, brigands- 
whose traditional punishment was summary execution (Owens, 2002).  
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Another interesting aspect of the Yemen case, which I will explore further in 
Chapter VI, is the CIA’s role in the assassination.  The CIA is not part of the U.S. armed 
forces, yet the rationale supporting the legality of the Yemen strike depends heavily on 
the legitimacy of a military operation, using lethal force against enemy combatants.  
President Bush gave the CIA authority to target members of Al-Qaeda, but when 
considering law of war arguments the question arises whether the CIA operatives 
themselves were lawful combatants.  If not, “they [the CIA] would not theoretically have 
the right to participate in hostilities, and their killing of al-Harithi would not be 
sanctioned under international humanitarian law” (Dworkin, 2002).  Additionally, would 
this mean that CIA operatives controlling the UAV were also fair game as targets of 
lethal force under the law of armed conflict? 
Another consideration is the legality of the presidential finding itself.  “As defined 
in the Hughes-Ryan amendment of 1974 and the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, a 
finding concerns only the use of appropriated funds for covert action by intelligence 
agencies” (Gellman, 2001).  The classification of the findings precludes detailed 
examination and analysis, but it is possible the basis for the CIA’s assassination 
operations is a very broad interpretation of congressional law, and is standing on shaky 
ground. 
Legal debate of assassination policy centers on interpretation.  One nation, and its 
supporters, may determine assassinations in certain contexts legitimate action; other 
nations, international organizations and critics may call assassination a clear violation of 
law and human rights.  Even if an act is technically justifiable, however, political 
ramifications can cause additional tensions that may make assassination policy 
unsupportable.  
D. POLITICAL DEBATE 
The political frictions surrounding assassination policy are readily apparent in 
international response to the high-profile assassinations and assassination attempts 
detailed in Chapters III and IV.  In Bullets with Names, Herbert remarks,  
The assassination ban reflected the temper of the 1970s.  The American 
public no longer perceived the Communist menace as the dominant threat.  
The greatest threat was internal: a powerful, unchecked and abusive 
central government.  But the times and the threats have since changed.  As 
a result, frictions have developed between the ideals contained in the 
assassination ban and modern threats to national security. (Herbert, 1992, 
p. 56) 
After 9/11, the U.S. turned a corner in its policy dealings with international terrorists.  Al-
Qaeda and the organization’s supporters now represented a direct threat to U.S. national 
security, and the attacks on American soil warranted a forceful, albeit surgical, response.  
But many saw President Bush’s declared “war on terror” as a nebulous notion; how could 
the U.S. declare war on a tactic, a concept, which in and of itself escaped precise 
definition?  There has been additional concern that the U.S., in lifting the assassination 
ban, would act unilaterally in violation of other countries’ sovereignty when pursuing and 
targeting terrorists.  According to Dworkin, U.S. officials (in off-the-record briefings) 
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have suggested that if necessary they will conduct military operations, including targeted 
killings, overseas without host country knowledge or consent.  Even though the U.S. 
could claim self-defense, this could constitute a perceived act of aggression (Dworkin, 
2002). 
On September 20, 2001, the international organization Human Rights Watch sent 
a letter to President Bush and U.S. Congressional leaders expressing their concern over 
potential policy changes.  The organization was concerned specifically with proposals to 
end the assassination ban and ease restrictions on CIA recruitment of “abusive” 
informants.  In addressing the assassination ban, Human Rights Watch stated, “A policy 
of assassination poses a dangerous risk of backfiring—the U.S. as an open society is 
particularly vulnerable in this regard—and is obviously a blatant violation of the right to 
life” (Fanton & Roth, 2001).  The letter goes on to say that the constraints imposed by the 
ban are in keeping with U.S. military and law enforcement values, and existing policy 
does not prohibit the U.S. from targeting military forces, including leaders, if the U.S. 
engages in armed conflict and prosecutes the war in keeping with international human 
rights law.  The letter points out that international police standards also allow law 
enforcement officers to use lethal force to defend themselves or others from the threat of 
imminent death or injury.  International and human rights law, however, prohibits 
execution of noncombatants.  Human Rights Watch was also concerned that lifting the 
ban would circumvent worldwide criminal justice standards.   It compared the declaration 
of a war on terror to the rhetorical war on drugs and organized crime, and encouraged the 
U.S. to take a criminal justice approach in countries whose law enforcement system was 
cooperative, with the guarantees of a fair trial (Fanton & Roth, 2001).  The letter’s 
assassination discussion ends with this statement, “Reverting to a policy of assassination 
would suggest that governments may pick and choose when these guarantees apply—
with lethal results—even in countries committed to the rule of law.  Such a policy would 
undermine global commitment to the rule of law and the most basic human rights, and 
America’s credibility in championing those values (Fanton & Roth, 2001). 
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Human Rights Watch’s argument is compelling, and America has indeed tested its 
credibility and democratic values in the international arena, especially with the al-Harithi 
and Hussein brother assassinations.  Overall, most people approved of the Hussein 
brothers’ demise, although some commentators argued that killing Uday and Qusay was 
excessive and unnecessary, and their capture could have been an intelligence gold mine 
for the U.S.  (Nordland, 2003).  Other than the objections of Amnesty International and 
Sweden’s foreign minister, and a few commentators’ complaints, the Yemen strike “was 
applauded by many Americans, and also by the media, as progress in the war on 
terrorism” (Hersh, 2002).   
A recurring theme in arguments against rescinding or violating the assassination 
ban has less to do with law or morals than with political wisdom.  Almost every anti-
assassination argument, including Bullets with Names, mentions that assassination attacks 
could invite retaliation in kind both domestically and internationally on U.S. political and 
military leaders.   
Military conduct thought to be unnecessarily brutal or widely regarded as 
illegitimate may ultimately result in festering resentment, engender a sense 
of scores unsettled, and invite retaliation in kind.  Those who advocate 
assassination as an instrument of foreign policy must consider whether 
America is prepared for the repercussions of it actions. (Herbert, 1992, p. 
110) 
However, the fact that the U.S. maintains the Executive Order prohibiting assassination 
clearly did not preclude Saddam Hussein from attempting to kill the first President Bush, 
(post-presidency) in Kuwait in 1993, or dissuade Osama bin Laden from directing his 
suicide operatives to try and kill President George W. Bush, any other politician in the 
White House, or military leaders in the Pentagon during the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Lowry, 
2003).   The world should know by now that terrorists have zero regard for laws of war, 
and they do not “play by the same rules” as idealistic nations.   
The idea that assassination policy violates perceived democratic norms is strongly 
advocated by Roger Herbert in Bullets with Names. 
The degree to which assassination violates democratic principle is 
arguable.  But legalistic debating notwithstanding, the anti-democratic 
perception which assassination promotes is undeniable.  Low cost 
victories accomplished through an assassin's cross hairs, therefore, will 
seem ambiguous, transitory and not nearly such a bargain when compared 
with the costs to America's image in the world. (Herbert, 1992, p. 116)  
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The 9/11 terrorist attacks changed everything, including democratic perceptions.  The 
destruction of the World Trade Center towers, a wing of the Pentagon building, and the 
loss of nearly 4,000 lives has sharpened domestic, and to a lesser extent, international 
resolve in dealing with threats to U.S. national security. 
Roger Herbert also brings up the issue of America's self-image.  He relates a 
scenario posed by Brian Jenkins:   
Just imagine the President appearing on television one evening to 
announce, “Some time ago I authorized the assassination of Muamar 
Qaddafi.  I am pleased to report to you tonight that American agents have 
successfully carried out this mission.” (as cited in Herbert, 1992, p. 118) 
Herbert claims “the reaction of the American public to such an announcement would be 
dramatically divided” (Herbert, 1992, p. 118).  If today, President Bush appeared on 
national television to announce the successful assassination of Osama bin Laden or 
Saddam Hussein, the majority of the American population most likely would rejoice. 
E. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Perhaps the most compelling argument illuminating the need for an adjustment in 
U.S. assassination policy is the absolute nature of the prohibition, which prohibits 
assassination even though it has vital use as an extremely practical instrument of foreign 
policy.  In 1992, Roger Herbert argued, “The assassination ban, as currently written, is a 
major obstacle to an effective anti-infrastructure campaign...Assassination, it would 
seem, is better suited as an instrument in a long term conflagration, also uncharacteristic 
of recent trends in American warfighting style” (Herbert, 1992, pp. 79, 96).  Currently, 
despite initial quick and decisive battlefield victories, the U.S. is involved in two guerilla 
wars, in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Countering the guerillas’ infrastructure-building 
campaign is vital to counterinsurgency efforts, and assassination of key infrastructure 
personnel should be an available option, without fear of legal repercussions outside the 
boundaries of the customary law of war (imposed by prohibitive Executive Orders).  
There are those who argue the war on terror is akin to an international counterinsurgency 
campaign.  As in a local guerilla conflict, destroying enemy infrastructure is a vital facet 
to the counterinsurgency campaign, and this includes elimination of terrorist leaders and 
key “nodes” in the terrorist network.  As Herbert argues, “A terrorist organization’s only 
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strategic asset is the terrorist himself.  Attrition therefore, is a necessary alternative in a 
‘war against terrorism.’  Attriting terrorists, however, will inevitably resemble 
assassination” (Herbert, 1992, p. 84).   
In his book The Transformation of War, published in 1992, Martin van Creveld 
predicts the spread of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) as the prevalent form of modern 
warfare.  Characteristic of LIC is the organization of war-making groups along 
charismatic and personal lines; the distinction is blurred between political entities and 
their leaders.  As a result, he projects assassination will become prevalent and accepted as 
a means to bring pressure to bear against the group.  Van Creveld also argues that 
conventional weapons systems, “are not sufficiently accurate to make much of an 
impression on an enemy who is extremely dispersed, or indistinguishable from the 
civilian environment, or intermingled with friendly forces” (van Creveld, 1992, p. 208).  
Herbert acknowledged van Creveld’s work, noting, “If, as van Creveld suggests, it 
becomes impossible to conduct a war against an organization without waging war against 
the leader of the organization, then the assassination ban becomes dysfunctional” 
(Herbert, 1992, p. 66).   
Bruce Berkowitz argues this same point; the nature of today’s threats requires the 
U.S. to target specific individuals.  Terrorist organizations are highly networked, using 
modern communications and small cells that can organize, group, and regroup flexibly to 
prepare for an attack.  “To defeat such networked organizations, our military forces will 
need to move quickly, find the critical cells in a network, and destroy them.  This 
inevitably will mean identifying specific individuals and killing them—in other words, 
assassination” (Berkowitz, 2002).  Representative Bob Barr (author of the original 
“Terrorist Elimination Act” detailed in Chapter III) made the case for not only targeting 
the terrorist operatives, but also those who finance terrorists, a vital aspect of the terrorist 
organization’s infrastructure.  Barr says, “Under traditional terms of war, those who assist 
belligerents are belligerents” (as cited in Gellman, 2001). 
A decade later, van Creveld’s eerily clairvoyant predictions accurately reflect 
today’s conflict environment.  The war on terror is a battle against a widely dispersed 
enemy, undistinguishable without good intelligence from the population, and highly 
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dangerous to the U.S. and its allies.  The destructive power available to these small 
groups and individuals, especially in cases where biological, chemical or nuclear 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) may be used, highlights the need for a flexible 
policy in dealing with people determined to harm as many Americans or “Westerners” as 
possible.  Assassination—when used in the right context and under the correct 
circumstances—may not just be the most appropriate and practical, but also perhaps the 
only way to deal with these threats.  Prohibiting assassination with an absolute, blanket 
statement contained in an Executive Order ignores the utility, if not the necessity, of 
having assassination available as a critical option.  The current ban on assassination is 
unnecessarily prohibitive in situations falling outside the legally “excusable” parameters, 
where eliminating a terrorist or threat outside the prescribed boundaries of armed 
conflict, as the Yemen case came close to approaching, may be the only choice left to the 
U.S. in a struggle for national survival. 
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VI. ASSASSINATION POLICY: THE HOW AND THE WHO 
A. A FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION MAKERS 
If the U.S. continues to use assassination as a tool of foreign policy, it would be 
useful to have a practical framework for policy makers to navigate through the tensions 
described in Chapter V.    
Doctor Robert G. Kennedy of the University of St. Thomas in St. Paul, Minnesota 
has advanced a framework for the justifiable use of force; in his case he was discussing 
the moral legitimacy of torture.  This framework is also useful in building criteria for a 
justifiable assassination.    
Kennedy’s first major criteria is that “the person or group employing force must 
have “Standing to Act.”   This means that the person or group must have some 
responsibility for the good to be protected by the use of force” (Kennedy, 2001).  
Kennedy describes this Standing to Act across the spectrum from broad (almost anyone 
witnessing an elderly person getting mugged or assaulted would have Standing to Act to 
intervene and protect that person) to narrow (in disciplining children only parents or close 
relatives would have Standing to Act) (Kennedy, 2001).  In the case of an assassination, 
this Standing to Act would have to be defined narrowly.  Only the highest levels of the 
U.S. government, and only agents or armed forces of the U.S. with direct authorization 
and the charter to protect and defend the U.S. would have Standing to Act. 
The second major criterion is “Sound Reason to Act.”  This exists when there is a 
threat of harm or actual harm being done and includes four additional criteria.  The first is 
discrimination: lethal force may only be used against a person who is known to be a 
threat or is actively engaging in threatening behavior, especially when directed against 
people (in this case any citizen of the U.S.).  The second is necessity: no non-coercive 
means are reasonably available and there is a legitimate need for action to be taken.  The 
third is proportionality: the potential or actual threat is serious enough to warrant the use 
of lethal force, and the force used is proportional to the harm caused (lethal force due to 
the threat of death to U.S. citizens) and status of the perpetrator (the targeted person 
plans, authorizes or conducts the threatening action).  The fourth and probably the most 
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controversial criteria is prospect for success: lethal force is limited to situations where the 
assassination will undoubtedly lead to the anticipated elimination of the specific threat 
(Kennedy, 2001).  General Sir Hugh Beach and David Fisher argue this same point in 
their policy paper, “Terrorism, Assassination and International Justice.” “A cause 
however just, will not license the use of force unless more good than harm is likely to 
result, taking into account the probability of success…it is very difficult to foresee all the 
consequences of one’s actions and well-intentioned actions may notoriously issue ill-
fashioned results” (Beach & Fisher, 2001). 
The third major criterion is “Right Intention in Acting.”  The person or group 
using lethal force intends specifically to prevent harm being caused or about to be caused 
by the targeted perpetrator.  Right intention does not include vengeance, obtaining 
advantage, or exercising power (Kennedy, 2001).  As Bruce Berkowitz argues, “The only 
time we should consider assassination is when we need to eliminate a clear, immediate, 
lethal threat from abroad” (Berkowitz, 2002).  Kennedy also brings up an important 
additional point;  
The use of force...always marks a breakdown in the peace and harmony 
that ought to characterize human relationships.  It causes damage that may 
not be immediately apparent and sometimes that damage later fuels still 
further erosions of peace and harmony.  It can never be chosen lightly and 
it must always be employed to restore an authentic and just peace.  While 
force is sometimes a necessary tool, it is also a dangerous one for 
families...to employ. (Kennedy, 2001) 
This view emphasizes, as with the “necessity” requirement of “Sound Reason to Act,” 
that lethal force should only be used as a last resort.   
Beach and Fisher argue “last resort” does not require that all other available (non-
violent) means have been exhausted. “This would often be a recipe for military disaster, 
where the early application of limited force may prevent the need for wider application of 
force later” (Beach & Fisher, 2001).  Rather, the “last resort” concept applies if there are 
no other viable options available, and assassination is the only way to prevent a target’s 
future acts of violence.  Osama bin Laden and al-Harithi are good examples of this 
reasoning; attempts to apprehend them had been thwarted before the U.S. decided to use 
assassination.  In bin Laden’s case, the Taliban refused to hand him over despite the 
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international community’s demands.  In al-Harithi’s case, an earlier attempt to apprehend 
him resulted in the death of 18 Yemeni soldiers.   
Another important consideration is the price of inaction.  If a certain iniquitous 
individual is left unchecked, what is the potential for even greater harm to innocent 
people or the security of a nation?  The power of small groups or individuals to cause 
extreme damage- especially in the arena of chemical, biological or nuclear attack- 
requires precise and personal options to halt the progress of a potentially devastating 
attack.  The destructive impact of an attack involving WMD would be of unimaginable 
proportions.  
Analysts Oliver Thiermann and F. Andy Messing Jr. of the National Defense 
Council Foundation argue for stringent requirements in practicing assassination as a tool 
of foreign policy. 
The main concern behind the removal of the assassination ban is how we 
would deal with it.  The attacks on September 11 have clearly illustrated 
we have to change how we combat and engage new threats in this post 
Cold War period.  As the president correctly said in the days following 
September 11, it is a “Special Operations War.”  Accordingly, we should 
act without restraint.  If we enact a proviso, it should have built in exacting 
congressional and even judicial oversight.  It should allow for 
assassination only where there is a clear and extreme threat to national 
security, especially the hostile proactive use of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction. (Thiermann & Messing, 2002) 
Thiermann and Messing mention a final piece of the framework also advocated by Roger 
Herbert in Bullets with Names.  This is congressional and judicial oversight, or at the very 
least a forum for debate and decision using America’s democratic institutions.  A 
formalized process involving U.S. lawmakers could provide as a check/balance for an 
executive branch in cases where a president may be tempted to use assassination 
unilaterally, without deliberate and proper consideration of the nuances and 
consequences.  The oversight could take the form of a streamlined Congressional 
committee, specifically designed to review, debate, and vote on presidential assassination 
decisions.  The president would have, as with any legislative action, veto power, but at 
least the assassination policy will not have been generated in vacuum.   
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The last piece of the assassination decision framework is answering the crucial 
question of whether the U.S. is willing to accept the risks and costs of using the 
assassination option.  “We should be clear in our own minds that, when the United States 
tries to assassinate someone, we are going to war—with all the risks and costs that war 
brings” (Berkowitz, 2002).  These include the moral/ethical, legal, political and practical 
tensions detailed in Chapter V.  This idea that assassination is an act of war raises another 
policy question that will be addressed separately, later in this chapter.  Acts of war should 
be considered military operations, so who should physically execute assassination policy, 
U.S. military or intelligence operatives?   
In summary, if the U.S. rescinds or modifies the assassination prohibition, 
decision makers should be able to satisfy six criteria prior to targeting specific individuals 
with lethal force.  First, does the U.S. have Standing to Act; does the U.S. government 
have the responsibility to protect its citizens from the targeted individual(s), using only 
those institutions entrusted with the protection of the U.S. to carry out the assassination?  
Second, does the U.S. have Sound Reason to Act; is there an imminent or actual threat, 
and is the assassination discriminatory, necessary, proportional, and guaranteed to 
succeed?  Third, does the U.S. have Right Intention in Acting; is the assassination 
designed to prevent harmful action rather than to extract revenge or retribution?  Fourth, 
what is the Price of Inaction; if the individual is not assassinated, will even greater harm 
result?  Fifth, has the assassination decision been subject to America’s democratic 
institutions of debate and review, rather than a single decision at the direction of the 
president? Sixth, is the U.S. willing to accept the consequences of an act of war?  If 
policy makers run through this framework in considering the assassination option, it is 
highly likely they will have thoroughly considered all the tensions, the practical aspects, 
and consequences of this highly controversial and important decision.  
B. TESTING THE FRAMEWORK: THE YEMEN CASE 
A useful exercise is to examine the al-Harithi (Yemen) assassination to determine 
whether, using the above outlined framework, decision makers would have arrived at the 
same conclusion to carry out the Predator strike.  First, the U.S. and Yemen definitely 
had Standing to Act.  Al-Harithi was implicated in the death of 17 sailors after the 
bombing of the USS COLE and suspected in the death of 18 Yemeni soldiers who 
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attempted to capture him.  Both the U.S. and Yemen had responsibility to protect their 
citizens from further attack from this dangerous individual, and the two governments 
used their state structure—military and intelligence operatives—to conduct the mission.  
Second, both the U.S. and Yemen satisfied most of the requirements for Sound Reason to 
Act.  Considering imminence or actual threat, Al-Harithi was reportedly in the process of 
planning for or even on his way to conduct another attack, evidenced by the fact that the 
Hellfire missile impact caused secondary detonations from weapons and explosives in the 
vehicle (Hersh, 2002; Landay, 2002).  The discriminatory issue is more controversial; 
there were five other people in the car with al-Harithi.  U.S. and Yemeni officials did not 
know who these people were before engaging the target, although according to reports, 
during the operation the Predator did wait until men and women separated into two 
different vehicles and only targeted the vehicle with men aboard (McManus, 2003).   The 
necessity of the assassination once again speaks to earlier fatal attempts to capture a 
dangerous terrorist.  Proportionality-wise, the threat posed by al-Harithi was definitely 
serious enough to warrant lethal force, and al-Harithi had already, albeit allegedly, 
harmed U.S. and Yemeni citizens.  There was little doubt this assassination would be 
successful; the strike occurred in wide-open desert, with lethal and precise tactics, using a 
platform (the Predator UAV/Hellfire missile combination) that the U.S. had tried and 
tested successfully in Afghanistan.  Thirdly, Right Intention in Acting is again 
controversial; some could argue this was a clear act of retribution for the USS COLE, 
meant as a symbolic act, warning terrorists around the world they were not safe from the 
U.S.’s lethal power.  The flip side of this argument is that al-Harithi was no doubt a clear, 
immediate and lethal threat who had already proven himself difficult and dangerous to 
apprehend using non-lethal means.   
The Price of Inaction is not so clearly defined and highly speculative, but based 
on past suspected behavior al-Harithi was a dangerous individual under any 
circumstances.  Was the Yemen assassination decision subject to America’s democratic 
institutions of review and debate?  Due to the highly classified nature of the post 9/11 
intelligence finding, the level of satisfaction for this criterion is unknown.  CIA officials 
maintain that their current covert operations have many layers of oversight.  The 
president’s finding, and a more detailed description of the mission, “is sent to the 
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congressional intelligence committees.  If they object to an operation, they can cut off its 
funds the next time the agency’s budget comes up” (Waller, 2003).  Although the 
connection between purse strings and policy is indirect, it does represent at least some 
form of checks and balances between the executive and legislative branches.  Lastly, it 
was clear the U.S., in cooperation with Yemen, was willing to accept the costs and risks 
of assassinating al-Harithi.  In conclusion, despite a few “gray areas,” the Yemen 
assassination appears to satisfy most of the framework parameters I have proposed in this 
chapter.  
C. WHO SHOULD CARRY OUT ASSASSINATION POLICY? 
If assassination is to be considered an act of war, the issue of who in the U.S.’s 
government infrastructure is best suited to conduct assassinations is especially 
contentious.  Bruce Berkowitz argues, “Because assassination is an act of war, such 
activities should always be considered a military operation.  American leaders need to 
resist the temptation to use intelligence organizations for this mission” (Berkowitz, 
2002).  Berkowitz contends that intelligence organizations such as the CIA are outside 
the military chain of command, and thus are not expected to obey—nor are they protected 
by—the rules of war.  Intelligence organizations are also not law enforcement entities, 
and using the CIA to conduct assassinations can too closely resemble Amnesty 
International’s “extra-judicial executions;” capital punishment with no due process 
(Berkowitz, 2002).   Representative Poster J. Goss (R-Florida), chairman of the House 
Intelligence Committee, raised concerns in an interview with the Los Angeles Times 
about the CIA’s increasing role in paramilitary operations.   
There’s going to be tension between when it is ‘military’ and when it is 
‘other,’…what are the new ground rules about using lethality [in] what we 
used to call covert action?  How much capability will be thrown to 
nonmilitary agencies?  I think there is still ambiguity. (as cited in 
McManus, 2003)   
Although most argued the Yemen strike was within the boundaries of the law of armed 
conflict, there are a few contradictions in the “war on terror” that immediately arise; the 
target is al-Qaeda (not a state), and many of the assassinations have been conducted by 
the CIA (not “lawful” combatants of a military force). 
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The CIA was initially (and justifiably) reluctant to autonomously carry out a 
broad targeting killing campaign, based on the authority reportedly granted by the 
president in the intelligence finding following 9/11.  The agency, however, “is willing 
and believes itself able to take the lives of terrorists designated by the president 
(Gellman, 2001).  In Chapter V, we discussed the legal tensions surrounding the findings 
and the CIA operatives’ status as combatants, but the CIA has learned from its past 
internal agony.  “The agency is determined to leave no room this time for ‘plausible 
denial’ of responsibility on the part of the president and the agency’s top management.  
That does not mean that operations will be publicly proclaimed…but that the paper trail 
inside the government must begin undeniably with ‘the political leadership.’” (Gellman, 
2001).   
The CIA now has several hundred officers in its paramilitary branch, including 
ground, maritime and air operatives—the air arm includes the Predator drones that 
conducted several strikes in Afghanistan and Yemen—and is expanding its operations 
into areas normally occupied by the military’s Special Operations Forces.  This has 
created tension between the CIA and Department of Defense.  Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld has been frustrated by the lack of cooperation and accountability of 
CIA operatives, and has reportedly planned for the creation of a similar unit to the CIA 
within the Department of Defense, accountable only to him (Waller, 2003).  There has 
been additional criticism of the general idea of CIA agents conducting paramilitary 
operations, when they should be focusing on intelligence collection and dissemination to 
military units who are better trained and equipped to conduct the missions.  David Wise 
comments,  
The CIA would be much better served by getting out of the paramilitary 
business altogether and strengthening its clandestine intelligence 
gathering.  It was, after all, created to avoid another Pearl Harbor.  It 
should concern itself now with preventing another 9/11. (Wise, 2003a, 
p.32)   
In an attitude reflecting fallout from the Vietnam-era CIA operations such as the Phoenix 
Program, Rumsfeld “does not like the idea that the CIA’s paramilitary operatives could 
start fights his forces might have to finish” (Waller, 2003).   
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Frederick P. Hitz, inspector general of the CIA from 1990 to 1998 argues the CIA 
is not used to the role the president is directing them to play. 
After fifty-plus years, the CIA is an organization of bureaucrats…This is 
not what intelligence officers do.  They’re not trained for it.  And the 
intermediary stuff is what went to hell in times past.  If you got out and 
hire a bunch of brass knuckle types…it strikes me that throws in the 
hopper all the things we learned about this bit of business in the Church 
committee investigations. (as cited in Gellman, 2001) 
If the CIA is not the force of choice for assassination operations, the U.S. military is the 
natural best option.  U.S. armed forces have highly trained, elite units, well capable of 
conducting clandestine or covert, highly precise, lethal missions against selected 
individuals.  In Bullets with Names, however, Roger Herbert argues against using the 
military personnel as assassins, especially when the killing involves political officials 
who fall outside the normal realm of an adversary in combat.  “Killing a political 
official…is ethically tantamount to intentionally killing an ordinary citizen—murder.  
When soldiers become assassins, therefore, they must hurtle ‘moral fortifications’ 
established by military tradition” (Herbert, 1992, p. 98).  Herbert feels this erodes the 
conventions of war, and will place the soldier/assassin outside the protection of the laws 
of war.  “Placing an American serviceman in this dubious status is morally contentious in 
any circumstance other than a struggle for national survival” (Herbert, 1992, p. 100).  
Sources within the CIA claim its paramilitary operatives “take on the jobs the 
military can’t or won’t handle” (Waller, 2003).  Resistance exists within the U.S. military 
against conducting an assassination campaign using military personnel.  According to 
Seymour Hersh’s New Yorker article, on July 22, 2002, Rumsfeld issued General Charles 
Holland, commander of U.S. Special Operations Command, a secret directive ordering 
Holland “to develop a plan to find and deal with members of terrorist organizations…the 
objective is to capture terrorists for interrogation or, if necessary, to kill them, not simply 
to arrest them in a law-enforcement exercise” (Hersh, 2002).  Rumsfeld has allegedly 
been frustrated by Holland’s caution and reluctance to attack specific targets due to lack 
of “actionable intelligence.”   Internal Defense Department memos reportedly noted, 
“The worst way to organize for the manhunt…is to have it planned in the Pentagon…Our 
prerequisite for ‘actionable intelligence’ has paralyzed us” (Hersh, 2002).  Rumsfeld has 
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considered restructuring Special Operations as its own service/agency, reporting to him 
and capable of conducting covert and clandestine operations normally carried out by the 
CIA.  Some military officials, however, have argued that turning Special Operations 
Forces into “hunter-killer teams” would atrophy other vital skills and force special 
operators to enter into a potentially politically explosive (domestically and 
internationally) arena of killing specific people for political effect (Hersh, 2002).   As an 
active-duty three-star general related to Newsweek magazine, “Nobody relishes the 
prospect of appearing before the [Sen. John] Kerry congressional committee of inquiry in 
10 years’ time” (as cited in Thomas & Klaidman, 2003). 
The internal debate seems highly ironic when we review history, and see that the 
U.S. military has been used repeatedly in strikes against leadership targets.  In most of 
these cases, however, the killing has been remote and has not required the “face-to-face” 
element of a “traditional” assassination.  A former military official, who participated in 
the Bush administration’s internal discussions of targeted killings, stated, “When you’re 
dead, you’re dead…if the means of killing you is a .22-caliber bullet or a Hellfire missile, 
it makes no difference” (as cited in McManus, 2003).   The indirect methods popular with 
previous administrations prior to 9/11 fit into the parameters of military operations 
against “command and control” targets of enemy nations.  The current war on terror, 
however, demands military action against less clearly defined adversaries.  In using any 
government organization to conduct a targeted killing campaign, U.S. policy makers will 
continue to face resistance and controversy without clearly defining the new parameters 
that allow U.S. military or intelligence forces to operate in such a personal manner when 
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VII. THE ISRAELI EXAMPLE 
A. AN ENVIABLE POSITION? 
Our analysis of assassination policy would be incomplete without some 
discussion of Israel and its assassination policy.  As the U.S. has progressed in its war on 
terror, the inevitable comparisons to Israel’s own fight against terror have arisen, 
especially considering Israel’s policy of unapologetically targeting individual terrorist 
leaders and infrastructure.  Israel’s assassination policy is deserving of a thesis topic all 
of its own, but the Israel example is useful in examining the characteristics and 
discussing the arguments of a sustained assassination campaign. 
As Roger Herbert relates in Bullets with Names,  
Some Americans, frustrated by a world of pirates, chieftains and Third 
World crusaders, look with envy toward Israel.  Israel operates in an 
environment comparatively free from the moral restrictions which the 
United States has voluntarily shouldered.  Military response, therefore, 
need not be considered through the cryptic lens of perceived world 
opinion.  Old Testament justice is sanction enough. (Herbert, 1992, p. 
115). 
Herbert feels this envy is misplaced, however, since Israel earned a reputation as 
somewhat of a “pariah state” due to its “eye for an eye” policies; this is a reputation the 
U.S. should avoid.  Herbert highlights the differences between the two nations.  Israel is a 
relatively small nation that fights on a daily basis for survival against enemies who would 
welcome its extinction.  The dangers are powerful and imminent enough to produce a 
domestic consensus on the methods, often including assassinations, the Israeli 
government uses to counter the threats.   But the U.S., Herbert argues, “is a huge country 
with non-threatening neighbors.  Its dominant imperative must transcend simple 
survival...Calculating utility based exclusively on comparative body count estimates 
disregards American history which still embraces as heroes those who killed and died for 
democratic ideals” (Herbert, 1992, p. 116).   
Some analysts, such as Naval Postgraduate School’s Defense Analysis 
Department Chair, Gordon McCormick, have argued the U.S. is now engaged in a global 
counterinsurgency against powers that seek to eradicate U.S. influence and values from 
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the world scene.  If this is the case, then perhaps Israel’s example does have some 
relevance to the U.S.’s war on terror and its fight to retain democratic institutions and 
freedoms.   
B. THE WRATH OF GOD 
Israel’s campaign of assassination against terrorists had its genesis during the 
1972 Munich Olympics, when Arab terrorists kidnapped and killed eleven Israeli 
athletes.  In an operation dubbed “The Wrath of God,” Israeli agents and government 
forces systematically tracked down and assassinated those deemed responsible for, or 
even remotely implicated in, the murders.  The campaign, with a list of 35 targeted 
individuals, was independent of time or international border constraints; Israeli agents 
conducted multiple assassinations all over the world including countries such as France, 
Italy, Greece, and Switzerland, amongst others.  The assassinations were not without 
error.  A widely publicized blunder occurred on July 21, 1973, when Israeli agents killed 
Ahmed Bouchiki, a Moroccan waiter, in front of his pregnant wife on the streets of 
Lillehammer, Norway.  The Israelis had mistaken Bouchiki for Black September terrorist 
Ali Hassan Salameh.  Nor were the assassinations always successful.  Israeli agents 
tracked the top commander, Abu Daoud, to Warsaw, Poland in 1981, and shot him 
multiple times at point-blank range in a hotel lobby.  Daoud somehow survived (Wolff, 
2002).      
Israel’s assassination campaign did not end with “Wrath of God.”  Israel sought to 
quell the intifada (the uprising in Palestinian occupied territories from 1987-1993) 
through strategic assassinations that would weaken the PLO leadership.  Commandos 
killed the head of the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s (PLO) military branch, Khalil 
al-Wazir (known as Abu Jihad), in Tunisia in April 1988.  “The attempt to influence 
strategic developments by means of an isolated military strike failed, and the intifada 
continued for another five years” (Luft, 2003).  The 1993 Oslo peace accords changed the 
relationship between Israel and the PLO from adversaries to potential peace partners, 
ending military action against PLO activists and unofficially pardoning pre-Oslo era 
terrorists.  Israel continued, however, to respond to innumerable terrorist attacks in a 
retaliatory fashion by killing specific individuals alleged to be responsible, especially 
people belonging to terrorist groups Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hezbollah.   
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C. THE AL-AQSA INTIFADA AND ASSASSINATION 
What is generally known as the “al-Aqsa intifada” commenced in September 
2000.  It began when the Palestinian Authority, deliberately defying Israel, unilaterally 
released eighty Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad prisoners (serving sentences for 
involvement in terrorist attacks).  Tanzim, the armed militia of the Fatah movement, took 
the lead in shooting and suicide attacks against Israeli civilian targets.  In the first year of 
the al-Aqsa intifada, Israel responded with at least forty assassinations of mid to high-
level Palestinian activists, the first being the November 9, 2000 Israeli Apache helicopter 
strike against a Tanzim leader near the West Bank town of Bethlehem (Luft, 2003).  The 
situation has gradually settled into the exchanges of violence characteristic of today’s 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, with suicide bombing attacks against Israeli civilians followed 
by Israeli retaliatory strikes.  The strikes have taken many forms, although Israel only 
claims responsibility for the overt assassinations.  There have been several Arab 
individuals killed by car bombs, sniper bullets, and other unexplained “accidents,” but 
Israel has remained silent unless it is an obvious government-sanctioned attack (Luft, 
2003).  On February 4, 2001, Israel’s Deputy Defense Minister Ephraim Sneh stated, 
“We will continue our policy of liquidating those who plan or carry out attacks, and no 
one can give us lessons in morality because we have unfortunately 100 years of fighting 
terrorism” (as cited in Amnesty International, 2001). 
Collateral damage appears commonplace in many of the Israeli strikes; on July 
22, 2002, Israel assassinated Salah Shihada, founder and leader of Hamas’ military wing, 
using a one-ton bomb dropped from an F-16 in a densely populated area in Gaza City.  
The attack drew widespread international criticism as the attack also killed fifteen 
civilians, including nine children (Luft, 2003).  This is just one example of several Israeli 
strikes in populated areas, especially the Palestinian occupied territories, which have 
resulted in civilian deaths (Amnesty International, 2003).   
D. INTERNATIONAL CONDEMNATION 
Israel’s assassination operations in the Palestinian Occupied Territories have been 
especially contentious.  Amnesty International is one of the main human rights 
organizations that have voiced strong opposition to Israel’s targeted killing policy.   In a 
recent report, Amnesty International comments, 
59 
Since November 2000, when the first extrajudicial execution is known to 
have been carried out in the context of the current Palestinian uprising or 
intifada, more than 100 Palestinians have been assassinated by members 
of the Israeli army and security services.  In the course of such attacks, the 
IDF (Israeli Defense Forces) and security services have killed scores and 
injured hundreds of other Palestinian men, women, and children 
bystanders. (Amnesty International, 2003) 
The report does acknowledge Israel’s main arguments supporting the assassinations.  
According to Israel, in the context of an “armed conflict” with Palestinian militants, the 
laws of war permit Israel’s actions.  The assassinations are necessary and justified since 
there was no other way to arrest or capture individuals in Palestinian areas, and they were 
“ticking bomb cases” where the individuals were on their way to an attack (Amnesty 
International, 2003).   However, Amnesty International disputes these arguments, 
contending that the targeted personnel were far removed from potential Israeli targets; 
Israel has conducted numerous overt and covert captures within the occupied territories in 
the past, and could have easily apprehended the targeted personnel (Amnesty 
International, 2003).   
Amnesty International also argues Israel’s actions violate international 
humanitarian and human rights law.  Israel is the “Occupying Power” in the “Occupied 
Territories” of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the Palestinian populations in these 
territories are “Protected Persons.”  Israel claims its obligations under international law 
do not extend to these territories, but U.N. committees have rejected this view.  Israel’s 
actions violate the Fourth Geneva Convention (Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War), since according to the Convention the Palestinian militants who 
fight Israeli forces are only unprotected “for the duration of the armed engagement…they 
cannot be killed at any time other than while they are posing an imminent threat to lives.  
Proof or suspicion that a person participated in an armed attack at an earlier point does 
not justify…targeting them for death later on [and they] may not be assassinated as 
punishment or as a preventative measure” (Amnesty International, 2003).  Amnesty 
International also points to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
U.N. Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary 
and Summary Executions as references for Israel’s violation of international law.  
Additionally, Amnesty International claims Israel deliberately puts civilians at risk “with 
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the practice of carrying out attacks on busy roads and densely populated areas, knowing 
that it would be virtually impossible not to hurt bystanders,” which is also a violation of 
international law (Amnesty International, 2003).   
Amnesty International’s reports and demands that Israel halt its assassination 
campaign seem to have gone unheeded by the Israeli government.  Since the report was 
published, Israeli forces have continued to respond to suicide attacks and other killings by 
Palestinian militants against Israeli civilians with multiple raids and targeted killing 
strikes in Palestinian territories.  As recently as September 10, 2002, Israel targeted the 
Gaza home of senior Hamas member Mahmoud Zahar.  Zahar escaped with minor 
injuries, but the strike killed his son and a bodyguard, and injured about 25 people. 
(“Timeline: Mid-East,” 2003).  However, a recent mutiny of sorts occurred within the 
IDF when 27 Israeli pilots, some of whom regularly conduct combat missions, made a 
joint statement saying, “We, veteran and active pilots...are opposed to carrying out the 
illegal and immoral attack orders of the sort that Israel carries out in the territories...We 
are refusing to continue to attack innocent civilians” (“Rebel Israeli,” 2003).  The pilots 
came under severe criticism from the Israeli government, although they are not the first to 
express criticism of Israel’s policies and refuse to conduct military operations in the 
occupied territories.  Over the last few years, there have been hundreds of Israeli soldiers 
who have opted to go to jail rather than serve in the Palestinian territories (“Rebel 
Israeli,” 2003). 
E. DEFENDERS OF ASSASSINATION 
After the Zahar assassination attempt, Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz 
wrote an article that essentially counters Amnesty International’s arguments.  He 
contended,  
…there can be absolutely no doubt of the legality of Israel’s policy of 
targeting Hamas leaders for assassination.  Hamas has declared war 
against Israel.  All of its leaders are combatants, whether they wear 
military uniforms, suits or religious garb.  There is no realistic distinction 
between the political and military wings of Hamas, any more than there is 
a distinction between the political and military wings of al-Qaeda…Under 
international law, combatants are appropriate military targets until they 
surrender. (Dershowitz, 2003) 
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Dershowitz goes on to argue that Israel should limit civilian deaths, but collateral damage 
is permissible in proportion to “the importance of the military objective…Preventing 
terrorist leaders from planning, approving or carrying out acts of terrorism against 
innocent civilians is an important and appropriate military response” (Dershowitz, 2003).   
Other proponents of Israel’s assassination policy argue targeted killing is essential 
in effectively fighting terrorist organizations.  Gal Luft argues, “True, terror persists 
despite the assassinations, and the policy does have its shortcomings.  What is less 
apparent is the profound cumulative effect of targeted killing on terrorist organizations.  
Constant elimination of their leaders leaves terrorist organizations in a state of confusion 
and disarray” (Luft, 2003).  Luft compares the fight against terror to fighting car 
accidents; “One can count the casualties but not those whose lives were spared by 
prevention” (Luft, 2003).   
Steven R. David presents both sides of the targeted killing argument and a 
thorough treatment of the subject in his article, “Fatal Choices: Israel’s Policy of 
Targeted Killing.”  David says, “There is no question that Israel’s policy of targeted 
killing has hurt the capability of its Arab adversaries to prosecute attacks against Israel” 
(David, 2002, p. 6).  Using the 1995 assassination of Islamic Jihad leader Shikaki in 
Malta as an example, he contends the assassination of terrorist group leaders can 
undermine the organization’s efficacy.  Islamic Jihad was ineffective for several years as 
successors struggled over power and policy.  He also argues that Palestinian terrorist 
organizations confine leadership, planning and tactical skill to a few key individuals, and 
assassinations degrade the capability to organize and carry out attacks.  David also 
contends assassination keeps terrorists on the run, acts as a deterrent, and is popular with 
the Israeli public (David, 2002, pp. 6-8).   
In presenting the counterargument, David points out the fact that the 
assassinations have actually led to more Israeli deaths, especially in recent years during 
the al-Aqsa intifada.  He says, 
Targeted killings have provoked murderous retaliations, eliminated 
individuals who might have become pragmatic negotiators for peace, 
diverted the resources of intelligence agencies away from existential 
threats, “burned” informers, generated international condemnation, 
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recruited new volunteers for terrorist acts, enhanced the standing of 
organizations whose leaders have been marked for death, and promoted 
the unity of groups confronting Israel. (David, 2002, p. 12)   
Surprisingly, David concludes despite all the strong arguments against targeted 
killing, Israel should continue using it as a tactic.  He argues that targeted killing is not 
the same as assassination; assassination carries a pejorative connotation with implied 
disapproval, whereas targeted killing more accurately describes what the Israelis actually 
do.  Targeted killing policy upholds “just war” traditions due to its discriminate and 
proportionate nature.  Targeted killing gives the Israeli public a sense of revenge, which 
keeps Israeli society from being demoralized after withstanding repeated, unanswered 
attacks.  Because it is state-sanctioned revenge, anger at the government is dissipated by 
the real pursuit of justice.  Retribution is a valuable action for the government to punish 
those who have inflicted violence on others.  Also, targeted killing is the “least bad” 
option Israel can pursue in its response to terrorism.  If targeted killing can accomplish 
the goal of rooting out terrorists, as opposed to large and controversial IDF incursions 
into Palestinian territories, Israel can avoid the resentment and additional collateral 
damage associated with such action.  Finally, David argues “it is far too early to declare 
targeted killing an ineffective or failed policy…the absence of a short or even medium 
term benefit does not mean that targeted killings will not, over the long haul, eventually 
undermine the infrastructure of terror constructed by the Palestinians” (David, 2003, p. 
21).   
F. RELEVANCE TO THE U.S. 
Israel’s targeted killing policy has major relevance to the U.S.’s own fight against 
terror.  The U.S. can learn a great deal about combating terrorist threats from the Israeli 
approach.  As David observes, “If the Israelis have embarked upon a successful approach, 
it makes sense to emulate them.  If Israeli policy is fundamentally flawed, however, 
better to understand that now, especially when voices demanding that terrorists be hunted 
down and killed have grown so loud” (David, 2002, p. 1).   
Of note is the U.S. response to Israel’s targeted killing campaign.  The Bush 
administration has repeatedly condemned Israel’s targeted killing policy, although there 
have been some exceptions.  In August 2001, U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney discussed 
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Israel’s assassination policy with Fox News, saying, “If you've got an organization that 
has plotted or is plotting some kind of suicide bomber attack, for example, and they have 
evidence of who it is and where they're located, I think there's some justification in their 
trying to protect themselves by preempting” (as cited in Luft, 2003).  During a press 
briefing the next day with White House spokesman Ari Fleisher, journalists repeatedly 
peppered Fleisher about the administration’s debatably inconsistent stance.  Fleisher 
maintained the administration was “in unison” about the Israeli issue and “it is the policy 
of the United States to oppose these killings” (“Press Briefing,” 2001).  After the July 
2002 Israeli F-16 strike in Gaza City, State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher 
said, “As we’ve said before, we’ve made it repeatedly clear that we oppose targeted 
killings” (as cited in Boot, 2002).  When asked what the difference was between Israel’s 
actions and the U.S.’s similar operations in Afghanistan during a press briefing following 
the incident, Ari Fleisher argued, “It is inaccurate to compare the two...the crucial 
difference...being...this was a deliberate attack against a building in which civilians were 
known to be located” (“Press Briefing,” 2002).  After the November 2002 Yemen 
assassination, the press asked Boucher whether U.S. policy against targeted killings had 
changed.  Boucher responded, “Our policy on targeted killing in the Israeli-Palestinian 
context has not changed...the factors we cited for our opposition to targeted killings were 
particular to that set of circumstances” (State Department, 2002).   
David offers four improvements to Israeli targeted killing that may be relevant to 
the U.S.’s own assassination policy.  First, he suggests Israel should accept responsibility 
and be “open and unapologetic” in its moral and legitimate response, in the form of 
targeted killing to terrorist attack.  Second, Israel must conduct targeted killings along 
stringent guidelines using democratic institutions for oversight, in order to avoid 
degeneration into savagery that makes the policy worse than the terrorist threat it seeks to 
counter.  Third, Israel must draw the distinction between combatants and political 
leaders, and refrain from killing the latter.  Fourth, Israel must publicly announce that the 
targeted killing campaign is a temporary weapon of war in an armed conflict, and the 
killings will end when the Palestinian Authority makes true peace with Israel.  Targeted 
killing is a “necessary evil,” a means to an end, and should never substitute for a political 
settlement (David, 2002, pp. 21-22). 
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In the war on terror, the U.S. has entered into similar arenas of ambiguity as the 
Israelis.  International law does not adequately address the gray area between war and 
peace.  Israel is in an armed conflict with Palestinian militants much like the U.S. is in an 
armed conflict with al-Qaeda members, but neither the Palestinians nor al-Qaeda are 
states with armies.  Amnesty International’s concerns about extra-judicial executions are 
valid, especially when considering Israel’s occupied territories and the vast desert of 
Yemen in which both areas’ “protectors” allowed assassination operations to occur 
within their borders.  In both cases, however, international condemnation does not offer a 
prescriptive alternative, and the countries facing the threats must use the “least bad” 
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. PENETRATING THE HAZE 
Assassination in the modern world is an extremely complex issue requiring 
detailed thought and analysis in formulating policy.  To review our own study, first we 
discussed Roger Herbert’s Bullets with Names, which captured the assassination debate 
over a decade ago and provided a springboard to launch our analysis.  Herbert argued 
assassination had no place in American foreign policy, but the Executive Order ban was 
dysfunctional and assassination policy required normalization.  Next we tackled 
assassination’s definitional issues, establishing parameters and criteria that satisfied all 
possible connotations.  We discussed assassination policy before and after the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and examined the moral, ethical, legal, political and practical 
considerations that create policy tensions.  We developed potential frameworks for policy 
makers to follow in making assassination decisions.   We debated which government 
institutions were best suited to carry out assassinations.   Finally, we discussed the Israeli 
assassination campaign and the controversy surrounding it over the last three decades.   
Let us return to Roger Herbert’s argument that assassination has no place in 
American foreign policy.  In Chapter II, I described how Herbert came to his conclusions, 
with three arguments for and six arguments against assassination.  I would add a few 
more arguments of my own to Herbert’s supporting U.S.-sponsored assassinations.  First, 
the nature of the threat the U.S. faces today requires an option for swiftly and precisely 
dealing with small groups or individuals who may have disproportionate destructive 
power in their grasp.  Assassination may not only be the best option, but also the lone 
method for stopping a stateless, “noncombatant” but highly dangerous individual bent on 
mass destruction.   The U.S. can ill afford to be shackled by concerns and semantics in 
getting around the assassination ban to quickly address and prosecute the threat.   The 
current administration may have no problem with this scenario, but future, less bold and 
indecisive administrations may find themselves tied up in knots by the current rules. 
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Second, the U.S. is involved in what amounts to a long-term, global 
counterinsurgency campaign.  Chris Seiple, Naval Postgraduate School graduate and 
President of the Institute for Global Engagement argues,  
We are in fact engaged in a three-front global counterinsurgency against 
very specific people and organizations.  The first front is the attack on the 
terrorists themselves and their infrastructure.  The second front is the 
attack on the conditions that make terrorism a viable weapon for our 
adversaries.  The third front is the public diplomacy that explains the first 
two in a way that builds American credibility and legitimacy, in part, 
through making this war everyone’s and not just America’s (Seiple, 2003). 
This first front requires the freedom to strike specific terrorists with lethal force wherever 
and whenever the U.S. is able.  This may include operations that may qualify as 
traditional violations of national sovereignty, as U.S. forces cross international borders, 
or, as in the Israel Occupied Territories and Yemen cases, violations of traditional 
“protected persons” conventions.     
Third, the U.S. is now living the reality of Martin van Creveld’s predicted arena 
of modern warfare, where Low Intensity Conflict is the norm, even in the aftermath of 
initially successful conventional campaigns such as Afghanistan and Iraq.  The enemy is 
dispersed and intermingled with the civilian population, requiring a degree of precision 
more suited to a sniper’s bullet than to a 2,000 lb JDAM.  A war-fighting organization’s 
leaders are a critical target set of the overall campaign in battling threats to U.S. national 
security.  For the first time in U.S. history, sub-state actors outside the normal 
conventions of war and conflict threaten America’s national security.  Assassination is a 
discriminate, proportionate method critical to effectively prosecuting these threats. 
In disagreeing with assassination as a tool of foreign policy, Herbert outlines six 
arguments, several of which are no longer relevant or valid.  Many, including Herbert, 
argue that if the U.S. practiced assassination it would invite retaliation in kind.  Although 
this seems to be true in the Israeli case (though one could argue Israel fits into the 
“chicken or egg” argument as to who provoked who first), the Executive Order 
prohibiting assassination has not been a major factor in encouraging the U.S.’s enemies 
to be less lethal against U.S. officials, military or civilian, or take moral considerations 
into planning their attacks against innocents.  As to an assassination operation’s highly 
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complex character with no guarantees of success, the Yemen case demonstrates the 
effectiveness of a well-planned, intelligence-driven mission with highly successful 
results.  This degree of precision and target identification is difficult, but not impossible.  
The U.S. has the capability to successfully conduct targeted killing operations with a high 
degree of discrimination and minimal collateral damage.    
The difficulty with identifying who would carry out assassination policy remains, 
but both CIA operatives and military units have overcome a lot of the bureaucratic inertia 
and risk aversion that caused hesitation in the early days of the “war against terror.”  Both 
intelligence and military units are capable and to some degree willing to conduct 
assassinations, but the gray areas of what constitutes armed conflict and who is a lawful 
combatant calls the current mode of operation—presidential findings authorizing lethal 
covert action—into question.   
Herbert’s argument that assassination as an option in foreign policy may erode 
democratic norms may have applied in the early 1990s, but is no longer relevant to a 
country that demands justice after the loss of almost 4,000 innocent people in a single 
morning on September 11, 2001.  Steven R. David points out some interesting poll results 
amongst both Israel and the U.S.’s democratic populations when asked about targeted 
killing policies in 2002.  65 percent of Americans polled supported Mideast 
assassinations, even though 40 percent felt assassinations would increase the likelihood 
of retaliation from terrorists.  Likewise, only 19 percent of Israelis polled felt targeted 
killings had decreased terrorism, but more than 70 percent of Israelis supported the policy 
(David, 2002, p. 18).  These counterintuitive results suggest both the U.S. and Israeli 
populations desire for revenge, retribution, and justice outweigh concerns about security 
or democratic norms.  Targeted killings, or assassinations, may actually be the “least bad” 
of all responses, in keeping with democratic values due to these actions’ proportionality 
and discrimination.  These qualities may make assassination the most moral application 
of lethal force.  Additionally, the U.S.’s credibility around the world, especially after the 
recent Iraq invasion, is a much larger issue than what assassination debate encompasses 
or influences.   
69 
Herbert’s contention that an assassination’s desired outcome cannot be 
guaranteed, and that those who fill in for the assassinated individual may prove worse, 
stands as a valid criticism.  This is why assassination cannot be used in lieu of the other 
tools of statecraft when dealing with uncooperative foreign heads of state.  Assassination 
has no place in foreign policy in the context of eliminating important foreign individuals 
outside of armed conflict.  The current assassination ban, however, makes no distinction 
between war and peace, says nothing about the status of any individual as a combatant or 
anything else, and makes no definitions.  Yet the policy is absolute; by strict 
interpretation what seems like the most legitimate targeting of an individual enemy 
combatant, even in a war, is a clear violation of the Executive Order.   The ban simply 
does not address or reflect the nuances and complications of today’s conflict 
environment.   
B. POLICY PRESCRIPTION 
International law does not adequately address assassination, or the modern 
conflict milieu, where wars between nations and sub-state actors are becoming the norm.  
The U.S. can set the stage and cut through this blurry reality by adjusting assassination 
policy to reflect today’s threat environment.  First, I recommend a new Executive Order 
that refines the prohibition on assassination.  It could read as follows: No person 
employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or 
conspire to engage in, assassination of foreign heads of state.  The United States, 
however, reserves the right to conduct targeted killing operations in accordance with the 
law of armed conflict against hostile individuals who threaten the security of U.S. 
citizens, regardless of the conflict environment or the individual’s status as a legal armed 
combatant or sub-state enemy of mankind.  The Executive Order could go on to define 
assassination and targeted killing, emphasizing that they are basically the same thing, the 
major difference being the connotation (or as Steven R. David describes it, “semantic 
baggage”) implied by the words.  In defining “hostile individuals” the Order would also 
clarify that foreign heads of state are legitimate targets in an armed conflict, and hostile 
individuals include terrorists, who fall into the category of “enemies of mankind” and are 
thus legitimate targets of lethal force.  In keeping with the law of armed conflict, 
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although “treachery” is prohibited, normal “ruses of war” are fair game, thus 
assassination can be as covert, clandestine, and “up close and personal” as it needs to be. 
Second, I recommend institutionalizing the decision framework advocated in 
Chapter VI.  This could take the form of a select congressional committee specifically 
designed to rapidly assemble, quickly review the situation, and forward 
recommendations, although the final decision would rest in the hands of the president.   
Third, I recommend the U.S. administration publicly announce the changes to 
U.S. assassination policy, emphasizing that assassination will be used only after careful 
deliberation, with proper oversight, and as a temporary instrument in a war against threats 
that require this type of measured response.    
As Steven R. David says (and we can substitute “assassination” for “targeted 
killing” since they really are the same thing just different connotations), 
Targeted killing is an unsavory practice for an unsavory time.  It can never 
take the place of a political settlement...targeted killing stands out as a 
measured response to a horrific threat.  It is distinctly attractive because it 
focuses on the actual perpetrators of terror, while largely sparing the 
innocent.  For a dangerous region in an imperfect world, the policy of 
targeted killing must remain a necessary evil. (David, 2002, p. 22)    
The U.S. can learn from Israel’s example, and in doing so must be careful to avoid the 
perception of conducting “extra-judicial executions” and disregarding civilian lives.  If 
the U.S. can clearly articulate its policy, and balance the tensions while allowing itself 
freedom to engage in specific threats, it should escape international condemnation.  
Finally, the U.S. should only conduct assassinations within the parameters of an 
armed conflict.  The lone exception is the largely rhetorical “war on terror;” in any major 
terrorist or WMD scenario, the U.S. should feel free to engage, with lethal force, any 
individual planning, coordinating, or executing such an attack.  The U.S. should use 
either military forces or intelligence operatives attached to military forces.  The 
intelligence operatives should be under special agreements affording them the status, 
rights and protections given to combatants.  Whether in the context of the declared “war 
on terror,” where the U.S. conducts assassinations in accordance with the prescribed 
decision framework against members and supporters of al-Qaeda, or in a more 
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conventional armed conflict such as Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, where the U.S. 
targets key leaders to affect the course of the battle, the U.S. should limit its use of 
assassination and refrain from conducting purely political assassinations against enemies 
who pose no direct threat other than inflamed rhetoric and diplomatic, political, or 
military bluffing. 
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